Yemen's Humanitarian Tragedy and Its Impact on the Vulnerable Population

Q6. Why has there been no international humanitarian intervention in Yemen?

Introduction

Romans once called Yemen the “Arabia Felix,” which means flourishing or happy Arabia. Currently, Yemen has the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Over 24 million people, which is 80 per cent of the population, are in need of humanitarian assistance. More than 12 million children comprise those who need such assistance. The conflict escalated in March 2015. This has majorly affected the country’s children population (UNICEF, 2021).

This essay will attempt to find the cause of absence of international humanitarian intervention in Yemen. In order to thoroughly understand the cause, it is necessary to understand the history of Yemen of how conflict started in this region, which was once a happy Arabia. This essay will first discuss the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law as basis for humanitarian intervention. It will discuss the Just cause threshold provided in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. This essay will then discuss the key reasons for lack of humanitarian, such as contradictory UN Charter provisions; contradictory policies of international relations; contradictory positions between the Security Council and its members High cost of intervention; and loss of ownership. This essay will discuss why humanitarian intervention would fail in case if it occurs.

Yemen has been for a long time embroiled in one conflict or the other. The 1960s saw a military rebellion and six-year civil war where Saudi Arabia and Egypt backed the opposite sides. The kingdom of the North Yemen was overthrown and the Yemen Arab Republic was established (United Nation Foundation, 2021). The People’s Republic of Southern Yemen was created in 1967. The 1970 saw the People’s Republic became the Marxist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, also known as the South Yemen, a close ally of Moscow. During this time, the north and south Yemen saw periodic civil uprisings and restive tribes (United Nation Foundation, 2021).

The year 1990, after the Cold War, saw the north and south Yemens merged into one. This year saw the start of a regional conflict that had nations involved. President Ali Abdullah Saleh provoked a crisis with its Gulf neighbours and the United States when he refused to condemn the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein (United Nation Foundation, 2021).. From 2000 to 2011, terrorism and threats of terrorism pervaded the region. From the year 2011 saw the start of a web of conflicts and crisis with uprisings, protests over corruption and hardship, heavy-handed government responses, Saudi-led military intervention and UN Security Council non-military involvement in 2015, and various overlapping wars between regional forces (United Nation Foundation, 2021).

With the current humanitarian state of affair in Yemen, considering that the humanitarian intervention success against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, why there has not been an international coalition such that that Western and Arab states that happened in Libya taken place in Yemen On this line, this essay will attempt to find the cause of not following such precedent for a possible humanitarian intervention in Yemen.

Why is there no humanitarian intervention in the civil war?

The United Nation Charter, Chapter VII provides for resolution by the Security Council for peace-keeping intervention. This forms one legal basis for intervening in a sovereign state’s affair. The approval of the Security Council is needed to take actions by states (Guidero & Hallward, 2018, p.16). An intervention is justified for humanitarian purposes. On this ground, there have been multiple interventions taken place. For example, NATA and the US have intervened in the 1990s in states like Somalia to help aid workers. NATO sent forces to Kosovo to protect the Albanians from the Serbian forces. The US carried out air strikes in 2017 against the Syrian government on humanitarian grounds (Guidero & Hallward, 2018, p.22).

International Humanitarian Law lays the foundation for humanitarian foundation for intervening by identifying the humanitarian issues arising out of war and by restricting tactics and weapons warfare (Guidero & Hallward, 2018, pp.22-23). Article 3 of the General Provision of the Geneva Convention III and Additional Protocol II prohibits parties in conflict to treat anybody not involved in the hostilities in a humane manner. They cannot indulge in cruel and other inhuman treatment (Guidero & Hallward, 2018, p.23).

There are sufficient legal basis for humanitarian intervention. Even without basing on the approval of the Security Council, there have been unilateral actions based on humanitarian intervention such as the 2017 US airstrike of Syria. Irrespective of such legal basis and precedent, the crisis in Yemen still continues.

Just cause threshold

The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty provides for the just cause threshold for determining whether or not military intervention for human protection could be undertaken. For such intervention, there must be serious and irreparable harm or likely harm to human beings in the form of large scale loss of life or large scale ethnic cleansing. The intention must be right to avert or halt human suffering. Military intervention is the last resort when other non-military options are exhausted (International Commission on Intervention and State Soverignty, 2001).

When one looks at the Libya situation in relevance wit this threshold, there were factors that made the situation in Libya met this threshold. There was a likelihood of large scale ethnic cleansing gathered from statement by Qaddafi that his regime would commit a massacre in his “no mercy” speech. He called on his supporters to commit ethnic cleansing of the city of Benghazi (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

In the first few weeks of the rebellion in 2011, the death count varied and there were no reliable number. The United Nations estimated 1,000 deaths. The World Health Organization estimated 2,000 deaths. The International Criminal Court estimated 10,000. Since early March, estimates were not definite (Downie, 2011). The regime’s intention to commit mass killings was seen in the indiscriminate shelling of Misrata (Pattison, 2011).

Another reason for the intervention was not directly the need for humanitarian intervention. It is also argued that there were dangers of regime change. These dangers were considered greater than those of humanitarian intervention. The reason was that the former involved a likelihood of killings of a larger number of innocent individuals. Regime change would have brought instability in neighbouring regions, which was greater danger. Regime change would have had brought about significant deployment of ground troops, which means the intervening costs would have had been higher. The dangers of regime change had posed a bar for permissible regime change, which was higher than that for humanitarian intervention. This had constituted an exceptionally grave situation (Pattison, 2011). As such, the intervention in Libya was considered much needed as the prevailing factors met the threshold.

In applying the elements that were observed in regard to the threshold, the situation in Yemen calls for a serious consideration of why humanitarian intervention has not been undertaken.

Yemen has been ravaged by war. Independent report shows that 14 million Yemenis are threatened by famine and dependent on humanitarian assistance. An estimated 50,000 Yemenis are killed so far due to the war. An estimated 85,000 children might have died of hunger and other preventable diseases (Mwatana for Human Rights., 2016).

The Saudi Arabia-coalition led military intervention has worsened the situation. Instead of preventing the violence, it has led to continuation of the violence and has worsened the humanitarian conditions. For example, its action of restricting of aid and food to Yemen has created more food and famine shortages. It has not considered that Yemen survives of 90% import of food supplies (Sharp, 2019). The humanitarian crisis is the region is the worst with close to 80% of the population (nearly 30 million) needing assistance. Two-thirds of Yemen’s population is food insecure (Sharp, 2019).

Official reports from the UN also confirmed thousands of killings. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the conflict in Yemen has resulted into casualties. As of November 2018, there were 6,872 civilians being killed majority by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition airstrikes (Human Rights Watch , 2021). Since March 26, 2015, the armed conflict has resulted in over more than 3,200 civilian deaths. Over 60 percent of them are from coalition airstrikes. Over 5,700 civilians have been wounded (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

Mwatana for Human Rights (2016) quoted a UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018 report that the Saudi-led coalition led intervention has attacked civilians and critical civilian infrastructures, such as hospitals, school children, schools, weddings, water wells and farms. Such attacks violated the laws of war. Also, four years into the conflict have resulted to over 20,000 Yemeni civilians killed or wounded. Half of the population, which is over 14 million people, are exposed to the risk of famine (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018).

ACLED reported even higher deaths with over 50,000 deaths (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 2018). Save the Children reported that the crisis has resulted to over 85,000 children deaths due to of hunger and other preventable disease (Save the Children , 2018)

The killings as a direct result of the war come within the parameters of “serious and irreparable harm” of the just cause threshold. The affect of the Saudi-led coalition led intervention in terms of the civilian killings and being wounded and worsening the situation leading to famines and pushing 80% of the population to assistance are all factors that come under the “likely harm to human beings in the form of large scale loss of life”.

In case of Libya, the dangers were considered greater than those of humanitarian intervention. In case of Yemen, it is the affect of the war, which is famine, preventable diseases and other worst humanitarian condition, which call for an immediate intervention.

The crisis in Yemen is concrete evidence that calls for the right intention to avert or halt the human suffering. The next section will explore why a humanitarian intervention has not been carried out.

Reasons for lack of humanitarian intervention

The 2018 report of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations reported that reasonable grounds that the Governments of Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are causing violations of human rights violations (OHCHR, 2018). Irrespective of the evidence, no humanitarian intervention has taken place. Some of the reasons, which are a mix on political and judicial reasons, are provided below.

Contradictory UN Charter provisions: Self defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the U.N is invoked by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition for their military intervention launched in 26 March 2015. Their individual and collective defence is against the attempt of the Houthi militias are to overthrow the power balance and bring instability of the entire region. They claim that the defence is necessary to protect the right to safety of the Yemeni people. (Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2019). This situation is a cause of conflict between the various provisions of the UN Charter. Even though, the kind of intervention by the Saudi Arabian government is accepted by most nations, the humanitarian and ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) pleadings are overlooked (Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2019, pp.8-11).

The defence of Saudi Arabia-led coalition has part rationality and legitimacy for military intervention. Such defence has created an overlapping defence of military intervention on the ground of self defence and humanitarian action (Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2019, pp.26-28).

If one reviews Article 51 of the UN Charter, it provides the Security Council to suspend the exercise of self defence. This Article provides for exercise of individual or collective self-defence in case of armed attack against a member. Such exercise cannot be undertaken if the Security Council takes up necessary measures in order to maintain international peace and security. Even if measures are taken up by the members in the exercise of this right of self-defence, the Security Council can take up necessary actions to maintain or restore international peace and security.

In case of Yemen, the crisis meets the just cause threshold. Even if Saudi-led coalition is taking up measures on the ground of self defence, Article 51 gives enough power to the Security Council to take up necessary measures, suspend the intervention by the Saudi-led coalition and impose measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, this has not been the case so far.

Contradictory policies of international relations.

Realism and liberalism are two principal theories that explain international relations and how the international system works.

Realism focuses on the goals of the states towards increasing their own power. States depend on military power as the best option to achieve security (Hadfield et al., 2012, p.193). According to offensive realism, threatened states may use alliances against dangerous foes (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 157). Power is the central feature of realism.

Liberalism emphasises on economic incentives. Power is not the central notion. It relies on cooperation and interdependence (Hadfield et al., 2012, p.181). This is unlike realists that emphasise on self-preservation. Raymond Buell (1925) first wrote about ‘complex interdependence’ in 1925. Inevitable social interdependence between states calls for restructuring of the order in economies, races and cultures (Buell, 1925).

If one sees the intervention in Yemen, the 26 March 2015 Operation Decisive Storm conducted by the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with other nations (Casey-Maslen, 2020, p.49) fits the characteristics of realism of alliance against dangerous foes. On a different note, there has been a development of diplomatic, political and economic relations between UAE and Saudi Arabia (Hellyer, 2001). They are both oil producing nations, which is a crucial aspect of their relationship and have emphasis on regional security. Their close ties are based on common religion, culture, history, language and tribal affinities (Hellyer, 2001, p.162). As such, they are close allies given the large similarities in their geopolitical and foreign policy interests (Luciani, 2005). This close alliance presents a complex interdependence.

The Yemen crisis is a representation of contradictory policies. On one hand, the coalition relies on Article 51, self defence, which by reviewing their intervention seems to base on self preservation and security the alliance and the region. On the other hand, the complex interdependence policies between the two nations exclude the regional or internal actors in Yemen that are contributing the crisis. A general overview seems to point to the direction that the two nations desire to secure their interests through the means of power. This overview also seems to apply to the role of other nation actors, such as the US and the UK.

Contradictory positions between the Security Council and its members. On 13 December 2020, the Security Council released a statement condemning military escalation in Yemen. They condemned the Houthi attack on oil facilities in Jeddah on 23 November 2020. The Council reiterated its commitment to an inclusive Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned political process. The members reaffirmed their commitment to uphold Yemen’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. (Security Council , 2020).

In 2020, the Security Council approved a resolution sanctioning war-torn Yemen. The discussion to the resolution mentioned UN experts’ findings that the Houthi Shiite rebels are receiving parts for drones and weapons, which bear technical characteristics similarity to those manufactured in Iran. While the U.S. and other Western nations supported to include the experts’ findings, Russia and China objected (Lederer, 2020).

Reading behind the situation, it must be noted that there are some political factors that also heavily influence the Yemen crises. It is know that Iran has ties with Russia and China. That may be the reason for excluding the findings.

On the other hand, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Germany provide support to the Saudi-led coalition in terms of intel and arms sales. Mwatana for Human Rights (2016) reported that the US and UK actively enabled Saudi/UAE-led Coalition forces to unlawfully bomb Yemeni civilians. The US has been providing arms, military and logistical support training to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The UK also has been selling the coalition forces arms. The support directly violates their obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty and EU Common Position on military exports (Mwatana for Human Rights., 2016).

While the United Kingdom and the United States being permanent members of the Security Council, they pass resolutions, release condemnation and show commitment to peace in the region, they also fuelled the crisis by supplying arms and military logistics. On the other hand, China and Russia another two permanent members of the Council may also be supporting opposite forces in the region as could be seen in the UN expert findings regarding the use of drones and weapons by Houthi Shiite rebels that are allegedly manufactured in Iran.

Given the political factor and the complex web of interdependence, an acknowledgement of the actual complicity in the ‘large scale loss of life’ in the Yemen crisis may expose the actors to scrutiny. As such, there is a reliance on a complex model of realist ideology with a mix of liberal interdependence.

High cost of intervention. It was seen in the Libyan, the cost of a regime change was higher than the need for humanitarian intervention. The Yemen crisis may also face a similar situation where intervening might not be possible. It will be particularly true for the US. It is also involved in the Syrian crisis. The US may be under an intervention fatigues, militarily, economically, and in terms of human resources (Türkmen, 2014).

For any kind of intervention, operation capabilities could be challenge due to logistic and infrastructure problems (Kress, 2016, pp.15-22). Responding to a humanitarian crises and handling its aftermath will require a large, coordinated effort between government, private and other agencies. Military usually takes a major role. Humanitarian logistics becomes an important military mission (Kress, 2016). In the Yemen crisis, there would be logistic and infrastructure challenges. The crisis has substantially damaged the infrastructure of the region (Sharp, 2019). Couple with these problems, the intervention fatigue will make it tougher to conduct an effective humanitarian conflict. These challenges will pose problems against operational capabilities of a possible intervention.

Loss of ownership. The Saudi-led intervention is based on two legal justifications. Firstly, it was launched on the request of the Government of Yemen. Secondly, it is based on Article 51, right to exercise collective self-defense. The intervention was initiated after the Houthi rebels captured the Capital city Sanaa (Apele, 2018).

The interplay of these two legal justifications has further led to other nations. Until and unless, the active roles of the outside nations are reduced, more decision making process to the internal actors cannot occur.

Yemen has the historical legacy of civil wars between the North and the South. It has seen civil protests against government high-handedness and abuses turning into violent protests (Guidero & Hallward, 2018, p.5). These are internal conflicts. The involvement of outside actors have worsened the situation, as was seen earlier that the intervention of Saudi Arabia have led to more deaths.

When the political process does not involve all the actors in the crises, which is the Houthi rebels, a solution arrived may not be just. The 13 December 2020 the Security Council statement to an inclusive Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned political process does not seem to regard this consideration. The member of the Council commit to upholding the Yemen’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity (Security Council , 2020). However, the opposite is the case.

Any possible humanitarian intervention must be sustainable. A national reconciliation between the warring actors must come from Yemeni’s themselves. The involvement of externally led efforts has led to loss of ownership of the country (Fraihat, 2016, p.225).

Why humanitarian intervention would fail?

Although there are just causes for humanitarian intervention in Yemen, the political factors, the contradictory UN Charter provisions and the deep embroilment of the main actors in the UN in the Yemen crisis would not bring any opportunity for peace and security in the region.

How and who would determine the type of humanitarian intervention needed in Yemen. The crisis shows that the four permanent members are not on the same page. It is not only the regional actors involved in the war. The members are also involved in the crisis. Thus, there is no clear outcome if any humanitarian intervention takes place.

The NATO-led coalition has failed to act in response to the Yemen crisis. If the result was otherwise, the 2015 Operation Decisive Storm would have had ended the crisis. The failure to act militarily in response to the crisis, which otherwise was successful in Libya indicates that there is an inconsistent moral standard of the coalition intervention. This is a selective intervention, which shows the actors are working towards their own interests.

As discussed in the previous section, the crisis has resulted in a huge need for humanitarian logistics and infrastructures. Major role to be played by the military may not be able to be carried out due to the intervention fatigue so far.

The Yemeni crisis involves many actors and huge number of victims. The crisis cannot just be categorised as a civil war. As seen earlier, many other nations are involved, which are Saudi Arabia, UAE, the United States, and other supporting nations such as Britain, Russia, China and Iran. Involvement of many other external actors may make this crisis a proxy war. The Saudi-led coalition intervention has focussed on the binary nature of the war as between the coalition and the Houthis. This is not so as there are multitude of combatants with fluid support and alliances (Sharp, 2019, pp.5-8).

Humanitarian intervention is an emotive issue. A lot of effort in the international community’s response is need for an effective humanitarian intervention. The selective intervention in Libya and the absence of action in case of Yemen is morally wrong (Hehir, 2012, pp.1, 7). This is a sign of a complete lack effort of the international community’s response.

The Yemen crisis is also a failure of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) endorsed in the 2005 World Summit of the United Nation. Paragraph 138-40 of the Outcome Document of the Summit provides that the individual states has the primary responsibility to protect its population from issues of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It is for the global community to employ appropriate humanitarian, diplomatic and peaceful means to protect the populations. The relevant response has to be timely and decisive (INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 2009).

The Yemen crisis is a proof of failures of all the responsibilities. Yemen as a nation has failed its primary responsibilities. The involvement of other nations is not to protect the population from the issues. They are advancing and securing their own interest. Since there has been no humanitarian approach and since the intervention so far has resulted in worst situation, the response cannot be said to be timely and decisive.

Rightly said, international community intervenes in humanitarian crises only when the geopolitical position and relations of involved nations allow them to do so (Pape, 2012). In the current Yemen crises, the parties who are supposed to lead the peace and security keeping process are themselves involved in the crisis.

Conclusion

Firstly, there are legal justifications based on different legal basis. The just cause threshold is in direct conflict with the Article 51 self defence right. Although, the Yemen crisis has resulted in large loss of life, self defence justification allows the coalition forces to intervene in Yemen.

Secondly, the crisis is fuelled by political tussle between the outside nations involved. The US and Britain support the Saudi-coalition force. Saudi and UAE based on their close alliance and based on a complex model of realists and liberal interdependence seem to secure and advance their interests in the region by excluding the rebel forces.

Thirdly, it may be observed that the outside nations – the US, Britain, China and Russia – are continuously fuelling the crises. The two former nations support the coalition forces. The latter forces support the rebel through Iran, which is their ally.

Fourthly, the political process in place to resolve the crises is with two flaws. First is that it is not inclusive as it is driven by the UN Security Council. Their commitment does not seem to include accommodating the interests of the rebel forces. Second, as a result of the first, is that the process is not initiated internally.

Yemen the “Arabia Felix” does not seem to have the slightest sign of being the happy Arabia anymore.

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