States are still leaders in Global Environmental Governance

States are still leaders in Global Environmental Governance

The research seeks to examine the argument that non-state actors predominantly in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a crucial role to improve the global environmental governance’s (GEG) performance for balancing nature degradation problem. My investigation accepts that, private participators are influential, but contends that the state persists to be the most capable domain in the problem-solving process with the fundamental principles of environmentalism narrow of Green theory (Maslow and Nakamura: 2008). I focus on the problem of climate change, as Hoffmann (2018:655) maintains that, the issue is challengingly complex, human-made, and it requires critical assessment about the GEG interaction with various actors such as state regimes, international non-governmental organisation (INGO), a transnational corporation (TNC) and individuals like members of consumer society. My first argument is that, TNCs are the weakest negotiation component toward a greener economy in GEG. TNCs capitalistic interest is questionable for any voluntary participation in environmental sustainability. For instance, the controversial civil cases with DuPont company have been verified for regular environmental, animal and even human poison in the US (Billot: 2019). The company produced toxic chemicals for Teflon product, which sales averagely more than billions in annual. Teflon has been in the vast part of the household in the Western world. The poisonous chemical has flowed from the factory’s local river to other State’s waterways across the country. DuPont operated in the same ethic manner in Holland and Japan to spread trans-boundary poisoning (Lerner: 2016). The incident shows that, businesses can fail to comply with environmental regulation in favour of economic gains. The compensation and fine regulation fail to meet the level one annual income in the Du Pont case, which makes such incident less avoidable (2019). Notwithstanding Locke’s construction of environmental sensitivity and sustainable liberalism (Liebell: 2011), the free self-regulated company model is highly problematic for those who ought to be controlled. The capitalist market would rather be seen, as a subject of strict regulation in governmental policy with strong planetary management. They are the tax and quota-based economic instruments (Connelly, 2014:185-8). Wainwright and Geoff explained (2018:122-4) that, the relationship between states and transnational corporations is a complex economy system with numerous factors and sectors. The unchanged orientation that companies are profit-driven and contribute significantly to state economic stability makes the negotiation difficult for policymakers. The confrontation of reducing the corporation’s surpluses in favour of environmental protection fails to be sensible in capitalist understanding (DW Documentary: 2020). As the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) note says in 1995, TNCs produce the most leading technologies and disseminate them. TNCs own the most privatised financial resources and keep running the world economic growth. TNCs fund the vast part of implementation cost for climate change policies. Therefore, political influence is inevitable (Newell, 2013:89). Ahluwalia and Miller emphasised that, (2014: 1-4) large corporate polluters are concerned about their public image and therefore they invest into ‘green washing’ campaigns. These fairy tale advertisements and donations aim to persuade local and international communities about business willingness to protect the environment. Foremost, INGOs oppose TNCs and they promote environmental rights to governments. One of such as organisation is the Greenpeace. It has become established by a small group of activists from starting nuclear weapon concerns (Wapner, 2015: 504-7). In the modern time, the INGO is structured professionally including an executive board and local trustees, and it focuses on four major campaigns in the destruction of nature worldwide: toxic substance, energy, nuclear and ocean ecology. The Greenpeace Council operates created campaign activities, which are tailored to a particular issue of environmental degradation in a geographically specified region. The Greenpeace’s effectiveness is based on captivating media content like documenting evidence. The external actor in the role of witness gets audience attention and influences changes in the norms and values of human behaviour by making the people aware of the consequences of their general consumption volume. The technological inventions enhance the organisational strategy with a non-violent approach, soft power in other words. For example, the Greenpeace has exposed Russian whale hunter practice and Du Pont’s production of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC). The latter has contributed to the damage of the ozone layer and the green campaign attacked the business plant in Deep-water, New Jersey. The action made the employees aware of the publicity of environmental concern. There was not precedent of similar unfolding before. The Greenpeace disseminated the captured information on film to media, therefore, general public were able to notice the clear connection between the production of CFC and ozone depletion. The outcome of the campaign created a cautious message and transformed a vaguely known issue to a common interest for the society (Wapner, 2015:508-9). Roose asserted that (2012: 348-53), the organisation adopted a developmental republican structure, which positions itself to democratic legitimacy. The inevitable consequence is that, this representational governance model cannot avoid a significant amount of bureaucracy. There is a strong presence of hierarchy and forceful management policy for lower-ranked members. The author identifies this poser as the deficit of democracy for professional staff. Notwithstanding, the aforementioned complication, there is three advantages of the governance model. They are fostering motivation and homogeneity in its members before they are getting right to vote, allowing the democratic process to promote the most dedicated members, and legitimising the decisions of the Council by creating a forum conducive to deliberation. Furthermore, I claim that, INGOs cannot substitute states and their functions but instead influence their policy changes in favour of environmental interest. Several intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) have notably started as INGOs and transferred to state structure later (Boli and Thomas, 2015:337). Legally speaking, Greenpeace (Roose, 2012:354), Greenpeace seems to be more a camp of professional activists than a democratic institution. Instead, it encourages several millions of people worldwide to change lifestyle practice to a more environmentally suitable habit, as opposed to representing their supporters from global civil society in high politics. It can represent only its members. This condition supports the idea of my argument that, the INGO’s function ought not to be the delivery of implementation politics, but education of ordinary citizens to make them aware of green issues and consumption impacts. This can be seen, as a positive model of social change (Connelly, 2014:132, Wapner, 2015: 509). Alteration of public priorities appeals to new needs that the government has to work with it to secure election chances for the next term. Herein, Boli and Thomas (2015:341) highlighted that; the state becomes a follower of cultural principles and norms, which are promoted by INGO’s. However, there are some concerns of INGOs’ performance and political demonstration. Authors (Boli and Thomas, 2015:340) explained that, promoted cultural principles can create extremist nationalism and exploitative capitalism. These manners produce violence at some events. Another issue is that, INGOs like Greenpeace can deliberately misrepresent facts to the public. For instance, oil experts share various belief and opinion with organisation activists about reducing carbon dioxide (co2) emission. The critical difference is that, industry professional separate reasonably realistic and unrealistic goals to achieve better environmental performance. In the BP multinational oil and gas company case with the British government’s involvement, the Greenpeace decries licence holder companies’ exploration on the Atlantic Margin. The informative statement incorrectly says that the activity unreasonably produces CO2. The government has further clarified that, the possible BP termination over the expedition on the Atlantic Margin does not improve CO2reduction, as this activity can take place somewhere else by someone else. The Middle East can comply with recovering a new demand, but also it opposes to international agreements to limit the use of fossil fuel. Their governments operate with unconventional resources that emit more twenty per cent of CO2. Additionally, the concern is dramatic that, there is a loss of a few hundred thousand British jobs at the occurrence of BP withdrawal. In this perspective, there is clear evidence that, a government has to act in a more complex and responsible way to satisfy the people’s ‘wants against needs’ than Greenpeace would consider doing it, and this proves the limitation of INGO spectrum (Watkins, 1997:528-31). In according to consumer participation in GEG, capitalism stands on two pillars of the global market: demand and production (Newell, 2013:99-101). TNCs explore cultural ideology of consumerism to target economic growth (Newell, 2013:21). Ordinary citizens are consumers in mass culture. I analyse the role of consumers from the fact that human consumption of public goods is twenty-five per cent greater than the Earth can replace (Kingsnorth, 2009:37). Less consumption can interrupt the negative trend of environmental damages, but the tendency of population growth and industrialisation leave an ultimate critique of human activity. Nonetheless, Newell points out that, the consumers and buyers put pressure on the expansion of industrial globalisation by expecting environmental policy practices that governments signed up for (2013:98). These are consumers who are informed by INGO’s like Greenpeace about environmental degradation, caused by large consumption. At the same time, state actor perceives the effect of more strict environmental regulation, as an economic concern on people’s every day life (Connelly, 2014:178-83). This factor generates more uncertainty for the state action, toward a greener economy, as the social cost cannot equalise environmental cost of production. In the perspective of climate change, I argue that, state is the most proficient actor to improve GEG performance. The new era of problem-solving has started in the field of low carbon by signing the Paris Agreement UN Treaty (2015). The goals are set to limit the global warming up to 2 °C, albeit there is an aspiration for 1.5 °C. The multilateral action plan transforms into a transnational approach. The more innovative format decentralises the mechanism control and involves multiple political players like INGOs and international corporations. Although non-state actors like INGOs have an only multilateral function, they can influence the state negotiation position and process. They create their agenda to persuade worldwide cities about the use of eco-friendly technologies, et cetera. In transnational initiatives, states contribute more to economically vulnerable governments in the examination of regional climate change, whereas, Kyoto Protocol (1997) predominantly focused on the developed countries’ responsibility in the multilateral side. The more flexible strategy relies on the national level of commitment rather than centralistic international approach. That is challenging, as it allows each state to decide countermeasures in their ethics. The issue is on-going, and yet the outcome of collective action does not unveil results (Hoffmann, 2018:661-3). However, there are some challenges with the latest climate change agreement. The first obstacle is that, the global economy largely depends on the use of fossil fuel. States have different economic dependence on fusil fuel, therefore their equity diverse in the negotiation process. Some states are concerned by national sovereignty in limitation of use of any public good. Consequently, the second issue arises from equitable responsibility and uneven distribution between countries of global North and South. The agreement of shared cost versus historical economic benefit in climate warming is unlikely between developed and third world governments. The third backwards is that the current measurement generates short-term cost cut, whereas the result of benefit is available for further generations (Hoffmann, 2018: 664). Besides, Newell maintains that, institutional activity cannot significantly improve the issue of environmental degradation, and some green problem is getting worst for four decades (2013:1). In this investigation, I highlighted that TNCs are the most questionable players in the field of GEG, as they allegedly overlook ecological limits in favour of financially return. They play a significant role in the state economy that makes their environmental regulation more controversial. Simultaneously, I have determined that, INGOs are capable actors to put green issues on agenda and influence the state governance. Their voluntary participation grows into a professionally structured mechanism to lobby various state departments. They can pioneer social changes and educate the ordinary citizens about environmental issue and sustainability as well. INGO like Greenpeace can modify the society behaviour toward more environmental friendly consumption, as opposed to representing global society’s interest. They promote new ideas, existing concerns and possible solution to the government in green politics. I have ascertained ordinary citizens, as the members of consumer society and end-users of industrial production. As a part of the global community, their role is crucial to back INGOs’ movement for environmental policy changes in negotiation process between government and other environmental representatives. In this respect, the state is compelled to satisfy the members of the civil public, as the mandatory criterion of staying on power. Nevertheless, I assert that, states are still the most relevant GEG actor to tackle environmental degradation. The latest Paris Agreement International Treaty (2015) shows that, states are able to cooperate for a common goal in climate change. The concept of treaty demonstrates the transnational initiative, which blurs the boundary between global North and South countries. All participator state can individually accomplish the national target in reducing carbon dioxide. Governments can interact with two influential and non-state actors for an environmentally positive process: INGOs and ordinary citizens. The two actors form state function to an informal agent of global society (2015:340-1) rather than the leader of social change movement (Boli and Thomas 2015:340-1).

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