Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes

James D Fearon (Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes).

Conclusion.

The research work by James D Fearon explains widely the topic, ‘domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes’. International crises are a response to a dilemma posed by two facts about international politics one being state leaders have private information about their willingness to use force rather than compromise and the other states that they can have incentives to misrepresent this information in order to gain a better deal. Audience costs allow states to learn about each other's willingness to fight in a crisis, despite reasons and motives to misrepresent. Domestic political structure may powerfully influence a state's ability to signal its intentions and to make credible commitments regarding foreign policy.

Argument.

James D Fearon argues that international crises are modeled as a political war of attrition in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, surrender or escalate. Any leader who surrenders suffers Audience Cost that increases as the public confrontation proceeds. How audience costs enable leaders to learn an adversary's true preferences concerning settlement versus war and when an attack is ration are discussed by James based on the Equilibrium analysis. The model also generates strong comparative statics results, mainly on the question of which side is most likely to back down. Publicly, once a crisis begins observable measures of relative military capabilities and relative interests prove to have no direct effect. Instead, relative audience costs matter i.e. the side with a stronger domestic audience (democracy) is always less likely to surrender than the side less able to generate audience costs (non-democracy). Also the analysis suggests that democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can, improving the security dilemma between democratic states. James argues that international crises are a response to a dilemma posed by two facts about international politics which states that leaders of the state have private information about their willingness to use force rather than compromise and that they can have reasons to misrepresent this information in order to gain a better deal. He has argued that the states resolve this dilemma by going public and this is by taking actions such as troop mobilizations and public threats that focus the attention of relevant political audiences and create costs that leaders would suffer if they surrendered. A game-theoretic analysis revealed that such audience costs allow states to learn about each other's willingness to fight in a crisis, despite reasons and motives to misrepresent. According to the argument of substantial literature in international relations, international anarchy together with states' uncertainty about each other's motivations, is a powerful cause of international conflict. James suggests that domestic political structure may powerfully influence a state's ability to signal its intentions and to make credible commitments regarding foreign policy.

Evidence.

The Cuban Missile Crisis in which Kennedy failed to ask Khrushchev what he would do if the United States were to impose a blockade or to attack the missile sites in Cuba, because his answers would have been inappropriate due to his incentives to misrepresent. It proves that states can also have strong incentives to misrepresent their willingness to fight in order to gain a better deal.

Nalebuff's (1986) and Powell's (1990) models of nuclear brinkmanship which allows states to escalate in a crisis indefinitely, until one side backs down or nuclear war occurs.

American elections or Gorbachev or Yeltsin's need for cash states that state leaders are sometimes impatient for a deal due to domestic political pressures than to a pure preference by the leader for territory today rather than next month.

Prominent strong public statements during international confrontation like the Lord Salisbury's speeches during the Fashoda crisis of 1898, Lloyd George's Mansion House speech during the Agadir crisis of 1911 and the Kennedy's televised speech announcing the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and Bush's many declarations on Kuwait in 1990. They appears to create fewer credible audience costs and have correspondingly lower value as signals of intent.

The politburo after Stalin which could sanction the paramount Soviet leader and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century monarchs could replace unsuccessful ministers.

Question.

How does audience costs, relative capabilities and relative interests influence the outcome of international confrontations? What are some of the implications?

What steps should the states take to avoid escalation that always leads to conflict stating reasons why and benefits the steps would bring the states.

What are some of the downfalls of this theory and how can it be falsified stating elaborate reasons?

Widely explain the apparent effects and importance of forceful public speeches by democratic and non-democratic leaders.

Expand on the two types of costs that could serve to make the actions that states take in crises informative about their actual willingness to fight i.e. the Signaling Costs in Crises and the Agency Relations & Audience Costs.

Continue your journey with our comprehensive guide to Domestic And International Analysis.