Operation Mongoose Memo Summary

Brief summary

The source is a Memorandum on Operation Mongoose, which is giving information on the goals of the operation achieved in the first phase. The source emphasises that although some work in this direction has been done, the Americans did not have the resources or the capability to do a lot more than needed to be done to bring about a state of affairs in Cuba when American intervention would be sought to over throw the Cuban communist government under Fidel Castro. The source argues that the Cuban assets or guerilla warriors should be used to propel a revolution in Cuba to over throw the government. The source also argues that the Americans would have to take a decision faster because time was running out on making a free choice on the liberation of Cuba from the government. The source stresses that unless the American government made a more clear decision on supporting Cubans wanting to overthrow the government, the Cuban refugees in America would take a call to permanently live in America and both the refugees and revolutionaries would lose hope for a revolution in Cuba.

Information about the source

The source is an unclassified Top Secret document in the nature of a memorandum, written by Brig. Gen. Lansdale of the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the review of Operation Mongoose ( ‘memorandum’). The Memorandum was written on the 25 July 1962. The Memorandum is in the nature of a report on the first phase of Operation Mongoose, which was a covert operation to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. The policy and the program picture of the Operation Mongoose was also discussed in this Memorandum. The Memorandum gives an operational report on how the first phase of the Operation Mongoose has developed at the time. The objectives of the covert operation are clearly mentioned in the document as involving collection of hard intelligence; political, social, and economic actions aimed at inciting Cubans and requiring American intervention; and an overt policy that aimed at minimal loss to American assets in Cuba.

Audience

The intended audience for the Memorandum was the Special Group, which included then Attorney General Robert Kennedy and some other members of the defense forces. The Memorandum was an ‘eyes only’ copy to this Special Group. The creator is trying to convince the Special Group to take a call on Cuba quickly by giving this information to the President. The perspective of the creator is to give support to the decision taken earlier by the President on 30 November 1961 that the American government will undertake covert operations to over throw the communist Cuban government. The positioning of the creator of the Memorandum is American centric. The position of the creator as the Chief of Operations and the bridge between the operatives who were involved in the Operation Mongoose and the Special Group that finally reported the events to the President, means that the creator has the information of all that is achieved in the ground and is giving this information to the Special Group for the purpose of reporting to the President. The author of the memorandum is critical of the Cuban regime and reports that the efforts against the regime in the first phase have involved attempts to recruit and organise guerilla warfare amongst the Cuban revolutionaries were not as successful because of the Cuban government’s security precautions. The creator stresses more than once on the need for the American government to take a quicker decision on Cuba and how it will support those Cubans who want to over throw the communist government.

Critical analysis

The language of the Memorandum is official and honest in its assessments about the Operation Mongoose phase one. The author is clear about the objectives of the operation, the tasks undertaken and the goals achieved in the first phase. The author is also focused on giving the information on the road ahead moving forward. The language is also oriented to emphasise on the perceived illegitimacy of the Cuban regime and the need to support those Cubans who come to America as refugees or those who are in Cuba but are potential revolutionaries because this can help the Americans to over throw the Cuban government through the latent frustrations of the Cuban people. The author also notes that psychological steps like reaching out to the Cubans through short wave and medium wave broadcasts need to be undertaken.

Conclusion

The Memorandum is a very clear and detailed report on how the American government could intervene in Cuba by supporting the Cubans who wanted to over throw their government. The document is significant not only from the perspective of the Operation Mongoose, which was a covert operation but the Cuban Missile Crisis for which one of the reasons was the increasing activity of the Americans in Cuba and the consequent support that Cubans looked for from USSR. Robert Kennedy sought to objectives given by Cuban explain that Cubans took Soviet weapons not in order to ensure their own defense “but primarily to strengthen socialism on the international plane.” This seeks to give an impression that Cuban government was more focussed on socialism, for which it sought to acquire nuclear weapons also. However, others have argued that the Cubans viewed covert operations like Operation Mongoose as continuing provocations. This side is not discussed in the Memorandum. The possibility that the Cuban government may consider covert operations to overthrow the government as an affront and provocation and take counter steps are not mentioned in this Memorandum at all. As events would later show, the world came close to the Third World War when the Cubans approached the Soviets for nuclear weapons to counter the threat from America and President Kennedy was forced to take further steps in response in an election season when he could not appear to be weak or soft on communism. Such repercussions of the American covert measures are not mentioned or discussed in the Memorandum at all, which in hindsight appears to be a major weakness as Operation Mongoose was one of the causes of Cuban Missile Crisis.

Bibliography

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days, A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.

Kramer, Mark. "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Note." The International History Review 15, no. 4 (1993): 740-751.

Nash, Philip. The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2000.