Cultural Relativism vs. Universal Human Rights

Cultural relativism and universality of human rights have emerged as two opposing and competing approaches as to how human rights are viewed. The opposing nature of the two approaches may be premised on the perception of incompatibility between western and non western conceptualisation of rights, with the rejection of universal values of human rights by non western scholars being driven by the point of view that human rights are a western construct. On the other hand, those who oppose cultural relativist arguments write that human rights are not western, rather they are universal. One scholar writes that human rights “is the fruit of various civilisations” and that “those who are invoking cultural relativism are really using that as an excuse for violating human rights and to put a cultural mask on the face of what they’re doing”. From this perspective it is argued that contrary to what cultural relativists argue, human rights are informed by universal standards and are part of every religion and every civilisation of the world. While this may be true, the problem is that different cultures may have different values for human rights; eastern collectivist and western individualist cultures may for instance have different values for individual liberties and social interests with the former prioritising social interests as compared to a the emphasis on the protection of individual liberties by the latter. It is also a fact that cultural notions colour the way societies around the world approach women related rights; eastern societies, particularly in the Islamic countries are considered to be more patriarchal with more restrictions on women rights. Therefore, even if it is accepted that universal standards of human rights are found in all religions and regions, it is also to be accepted that there are many differences in how eastern societies may approach human rights and individual liberties as compared to the western societies.

On the other hand, the universalisation project seeks to apply universal notions of human rights regardless of the cultural differences that may not allow such application of all rights in the same way everywhere. This has led to what Upendra Baxi calls the fallacy of the globalisation of human rights for its straining “the idea of universality of human rights”. In other words, Baxi argues that that the emphasis of the universalists on the globalisation of human rights has compromised the universal application of human rights. This may point at the rigid nature of the universalist approach to human rights which may not accept the impact of cultural differences on the acceptance or rejection of human rights. This essay explores how far the ideas of cultural relativism and the universality of human rights are in tension and whether they have similar conceptual origins. This essay argues that the similar origins of the two approaches are rooted in cultural approaches to human rights and individual liberties. Universalists have a certain cultural background that makes them propound the idea of universal human rights and they reject the idea that culture itself can be a determiner of which rights ought to be protected by the legal system and which are not. On the other hand, cultural relativists are also driven by cultural notions of what rights they find are compatible with their culture and religion and therefore are worthy of protection. In both approaches, there is an emphasis on culture. The only difference is that universalists deny cultural role in the formulating of their approaches while cultural relativists proceed from the point of culture. This similarity in their origins does not mean that they are compatible. The approaches are contrasted and are not compatible, at least if taken in their rigid contexts. However, as Donnelly argues, it is possible for the more flexible or weaker versions of universalism and relativism to be compatible and even beneficial for development of human rights. The following section of the essay discusses the essential differences between the universalist and relativist approaches to demonstrate how they are different from each other but also how they are premised on the same origins of cultural contexts.

There is a difference between how universalists and cultural relativists approach the idea of human rights as pointed out by Le; universalists believe that it is possible to legally enforce the same human rights everywhere because the mechanisms for such enforcement are available everywhere whereas cultural relativists argue that there are different ways for interpreting and applying human rights. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the tension between the universalists and cultural relativists is real and is based on the actual differences in approaches to conceptualisation of human rights. However, Le argues that despite such tensions, cultural relativism and universalism need not be mutually destructive, rather they can be used to inform each other and further strengthen the human rights protections of peoples around the world. It may also be argued that the universality of human rights and cultural relativists proceed from similar origins, that is, the perception of those who are articulating the rights, which may be put to culture; in other words, both the universality of human rights and the cultural relativist arguments proceed from the value of culture as source for determining what human rights are there. For the universality approach, culture may play an important role in bringing in liberal and individualist values to derive human rights such as right of liberty and speech and expression, whereas in the same way, for the culturalists, culture would play a role in deriving collectivist and social oriented rights. Thus, the conceptual origins of both the universalism and cultural relativist approaches can be linked back to culture.

A common factor between the universalists and the relativists is related to their agreement on the importance of the question on whether universal human rights are linked with western culture; on these questions, there is no agreement between the two because while universalists claim that at least some moral values are universal and not just derived from the western culture, relativists argue that no moral judgment can be universal in nature. The contrasting ideas of universalists and relativists on the question of origin of the human rights however is important and is explained as follows:

“The debate between relativists and universalists has created an essentialist conceptual framework that, like the debate itself, dominates the field ... Thus, to ask whether human rights are Western is to ask whether they reflect the values and beliefs of European cultures, whether they embody the social, religious, economic, or philosophic character—the Weltanschauung—of the West. Within the essentialist framework, all questions about the origins or the universality of human rights become questions about their validity; if human rights are Western they cannot be universal. The close connection between essentialism and cultural relativism is obvious; less obvious is the extent to which, despite their vigorous denial that human rights are Western in the essentialist sense, universalists also seem to accept that the essentialist framing of questions about the origins and universality of human rights is useful and appropriate. Put differently, relativists and universalists agree that the key point at issue is whether human rights are essentially linked with Western culture; they disagree about the answer.”

It is generally accepted that the development of human rights in the west is an historical fact. Although, to the question whether there is an essentialist linkage between origins and validity of the human rights there is no consensus; for some scholars in the west, there is such a linkage to be found, whereas others argue that there is no relevance to the point that because human rights originated in the west, they are also validated on the point of western philosophy or culture. The next section of this essay demonstrates that the former point is more appropriately supported by evidence from writings on individual liberties in the west where philosophers like John Locke linked the need to protect human rights to the creativism discourse as well as theology of Christianity on the basis of which the argument was made that all human beings have certain inalienable human rights. These ideas were incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the more modern period. Therefore, it will be shown that there is indeed a link between western culture and universalisation of human rights. Seen from this perspective, it can be said that the origins of both universalism and relativism lie in culture or religion which is what pits the universalists and the relativists against each other because the cultural arguments of one are not acceptable to the other. Universalisation of human rights became an important project for the international community at least under the aegis of the United Nations soon after the formation of the United Nations; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a manifestation of the expression of the collective international conscience on human rights values, which was meant to give effect to the notion that some human rights are universally applicable and should be accessible to all people everywhere. This lofty idea of universal human rights met with a challenge in cultural relativist arguments, particularly in the Islamic countries, on the ground that human rights that do not accord with Islamic values cannot be implemented in Islamic countries. The deeper argument is however not just about the tension between the universal values of human rights and religion, it is about the tension between the western and non western conceptualisation of human rights to some extent, and about the imposition of values that do not find acceptance in a given cultural context to a large extent. For example, literature on the development of human rights usually traces the development of rights from a western perspective where it is shown how rights grew out of liberal, individualistic and secular traditions. The idea of social contract is often used to trace the development of such human rights as part of the contract between state and citizens as demonstrated by the Magna Carta, and the American Bill of Rights. If taken from this perspective, it can be clearly seen that universalist notions of human rights are also based on the culture of the west, which is driven by the individualist and secular traditions as compared to the collectivist and more religious based culture of the eastern countries, particularly of the Islamic countries.

Can it really be said that universalist notions of human rights are perhaps as driven by culture as the relativist notions? A strong argument that even universal human rights are based on the cultural history of the western nations is made by Chris Brown, who writes that it is fundamentally problematic to consider the history of universal human rights as dating back only to the twentieth century, whereas the ethical and philosophical discussions on the idea of rights of individuals dates back centuries in western philosophical thought. He argues that it is a mistake to follow the universalist argument that the difficulties associated with human rights discourse is because of the problematic practices of the others. Stamos also argues that the origin of universal human rights can be linked back to what were in the first place theological discussions on human rights in the western thought; thus, in John Locke’s Two Treatises, there is mention of God, Creation, Adam and Eve and the same applies to other western thinkers who were conceptualing individual rights as they all used creationism as the background for making the claim of individual rights. The appeal to the divine in the conceptualisation of universal human rights are also seen in the more modern contexts of speech by President Kennedy where he talks about the belief that rights come from the hand of the God and not the generosity of the state. When these examples are considered, one can see how the idea of universal human rights that are seen from a western, so called secular and individualist perspective is really derived from the theological and creativism notions on rights of individual as God given rights. In other words, the foundation of universal human rights itself is not secular as claimed but theological in nature. This is not very different from the way relativists approach human rights as rights that can be compatible with their culture and religion. The only difference is that the relativists refuse to give in to the universal notions of human rights contained in documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the ground that these do not accord with the cultural and religious practices within their own communities. When looked at closely, there is not much difference between the conceptual origin of both universalism and relativism. While we do not usually relate the idea of culture and religion to universalism, a closer look at how the individualist notions of rights have evolved in the west before finding their way to be articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, will indicate that these ‘universal ideas’ of human rights are as much based on culture and religion as the relativist notions of human rights. For example, when Thomas Paine wrote about the idea of universal human rights in Rights of Man (1791), he based the idea that all are equal because God created all equally writing that “all men are born equal, and with equal natural rights, in the same manner as if posterity had been continued by creation instead of generation.” When this evidence is considered, it can be seen that it would be a fallacy to think that universalism is not rooted in some culture or theology in the same way that relativism is. It is argued that both are so rooted, but the difference is that relativism has been considered to be the ‘other’ or the opposite of the more acceptable moral position that is universalism.

On the other hand, relativists can argue that this otherisation of their practices and norms when it is as rooted in their theology and culture as universalism is rooted in western theology and culture speaks to the bias against the east. This is an argument that can be related to the orientalism notions. Edward Said demonstrated the binary of the Occident and the Orient which showed how certain values like democracy, human rights and liberalism are Western constructs, and may be foreign to Eastern societies. For the cultural relativists, a powerful argument against the idea of universality of human rights is that these ideas are based on the way the west emphasises on the dogma of the superiority of the West over the East and refuses the East the possibility of representing itself. Those who oppose universal human rights values in the Islamic countries for example do argue that these values were created without consulting the religious and cultural sensibilities of the Islamic countries and therefore are unacceptable to them as they are western constructs. To some extent, this tension between universality of human rights and cultural relativism is also based on the perception that the west views its own ideas of human rights as superior to how the eastern nations conceptualise rights. For instance, western literature on contemporary Arab position on human rights is said to perpetuate the image of the barbaric and undemocratic Islamic culture that is oppressive for human rights. Whereas human rights excesses in the west may be portrayed as aberrations. The debate between cultural relativism and universality of human rights often takes on a regional or racial colour because it is considered by the opponents of the universal human rights values that such values are derived from a western perspective; therefore, the tension between cultural relativism and universality is often times not just a difference of opinion on what rights to protect and how, but about what rights are important to a people from a civilizational perspective. For instance, Sachedina writes that the opposition to universal values of human rights in certain parts of the world is derived from the perception of ‘imperialist’ universalist approach to human rights. In both instances, that is, culturally relativist approaches and the universalist approaches, the genesis of the concept of human rights goes back to the cultural notions of the articulator of these rights. The tension between cultural relativism and universality is a real tension and has manifested itself in different ways within the international and regional law of human rights. An example of cultural practices impact on the way human rights discourse takes shape can be seen in the Arab context. For instance, some Islamic countries do not accept the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and argue that it cannot be implemented in Islamic countries. The universal human rights values have been opposed by segments of Arab society and governments on grounds of cultural and religious tensions between such universal human rights values and values and culture of the Islamic world; this has often had problematic consequences for minorities and women. Islamic scholars are not the only ones who have noticed this difference; for instance, Huntington too writes about the incompatibility between universal human rights and Islam. It is a known fact that there has been a development of human rights standards based on cultural relativist perspectives in the Arab countries, with many Arab countries defining rights on the lines of cultural or Islamic grounds instead of universal values. Donnelly put forth the argument that those who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were cosmopolitan individuals who did not really represent the sensibilities of the masses. Therefore, the point of view for the universalists in not really universal but is derived from own experiences and perceptions which are then given universal colour. This is similar to the way relativists approach human rights from their own peculiar and particular notions and viewpoints. However, even if they are derived from similar origins, they are still too different to be completely compatible because the very idea of universal human rights rejects the cultural arguments that may be seen to take exceptions to certain kinds of human rights. Donnelly accepts that the approaches of relativism and universality of human rights are contested but argues that it is possible to reconcile the approaches on the ground that extreme and radical universality and relativism are not desirable. He writes:

“The two extreme positions on cultural relativism can be called radical cultural relativism and radical universalism. Radical cultural relativism would hold that culture is the sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule. Radical universalism would hold that culture is irrelevant to the validity of moral rights and rules, which are universally valid.”

Donnelly distinguishes between weak and strong cultural relativism with the former having a viewpoint that accepts culture to be an important source of the validity of a moral right or rule but also accepts “a weak presumption of universality, and the use of relativity of “human nature, communities, and rights” as a check on potential excesses of universalism. As Donnelly argues that extreme versions of both radical universalism and relativism are undesirable, he proposes that both need to be checked by each other. This gives a different twist to the tensions between universality and relativism by arguing that both need to be checked in their extreme forms. In other words, Donnelly calls the tension between universalism and relativism as a necessary tension required to check the excesses in each other. Why is that? This essay will argue that the reason is that the source of both is culture and culture is used to impose certain values from the point of view of the articulator of those values with regard to counter values. Thus, extreme universalists and relativists both use culture to deny the disparate points of views that are found in societies elsewhere. To conclude, universalists and relativists are two opposing sides that try to link the validity of human rights to some moral or cultural argument. While relativists reject the idea that human rights can be universal on the basis of the cultural argument and therefore draw attention to the link between their argument and their culture, universalists manage to avoid such criticism. The idea that rights are universal seems to defy the idea of the link between their argument and a cultural basis. However, if looked at closely, the very idea that certain rights are universal in nature is originated from western philosophy where both writings of John Locke as well as Thomas Paine reveal the theological basis for their argument that all people are the same and have the same human rights everywhere in the world. Therefore, the argument that certain rights are universal also flows from the cultural notions of the west. Considering these facts, we can say that there is truth in the argument that both universalism and cultural relativism proceed from the same source, which is, culture. The only difference is that in the case of universalism, the linkages to western culture and religion escapes scrutiny whereas in the cultural relativist argument the link between culture and their opposition to universal human rights is too apparent.

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