Monarchical Resilience in Arab Spring

Introduction

On December 17 2010, a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated after being humiliated and mistreated by the police. His death sparked a wave of protests in the MENA region against political, economic, and social grievances. However, all regimes have not experienced popular upheaval similarly. While Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, all republics, have seen their long-standing presidents overthrown, none of the monarchies has fallen down. The difference between monarchies and republics does not only lie in the outcome of the protests. Monarchies, with the exception of Bahrain, have been spared from massive calls for regime change and have not witnessed the dramatic levels of violence, which brought long-term conflict to many republics (Anderson, 1991). Theories have emerged in the literature of the Arab uprisings on a presumed monarchical exception: the idea that monarchies have special characteristics, which make them inherently more stable and durable than other regimes (Menaldo, 2012; Yom, 2012; Gause, 2013). Despite laudable attempts to elucidate these regimes’ different experience of the Arab Spring, the puzzle remains as their exceptionalism is not necessarily self-evident, especially that a couple of decades ago it was the opposite way around. The fall of the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Iranian monarchy was a symbol of monarchical rule being “an anachronism in the modern world of nations'' (Hudson 2012, 167). Given the widespread belief in a distinctive monarchical legitimacy in the literature (ibid; Al-Dakhil, 2012; Alianak, 2014), the present dissertation answers the following question: To what extent can legitimacy explain the suggested resilience of Arab monarchies during the Arab spring? I argue that, both the perception of a monarchy as legitimate and the regime’s rapid, pacific, and reform-oriented response to the protests explain why uprisings have been, with the exception of Bahrain, less confrontational and challenging in monarchies. However, there is no one type fit-all legitimacy which can be applied to all Arab monarchies as each case reveals a different degree to which history, religion, culture, and even performance informed the perception of the regime as legitimate. Contrary to the literature on the case of Bahrain (Brumberg, 2011; Herb, 2012; Qadiri, 2015), I further demonstrate that, the violent escalation of protests and calls for regime change in Bahrain does not undermine the legitimacy argument. Instead, it reinforces the importance of both legitimacy and regime response in explaining the development and outcome of protests. The Al-Khalifa dynasty’s crisis of legitimacy along with its brutal repression of protesters explains why its experience of the Arab Spring starkly differs from that of other monarchies.

Scope and approach:

This dissertation focuses on the argument of legitimacy because it requires deeper empirical analysis. The existing literature focuses exclusively on the regimes’ claim to legitimacy and disregards the crucial perspective of citizens. Regimes are legitimate ‘to the extent that their citizens regard them as proper and deserving of support” (Gurr 1970, 185). Legitimacy without an audience is meaningless; therefore, it is extremely important to explore the opinion of the people. Moreover, empirical research helps assess if it is an argument which can be applied to different cases. Monarchies are not all similar; that they have different histories, traditions, cultures etc. For example, Gulf monarchies are embedded in a tribal culture which is much less prevalent outside the Gulf (Tetreault 2011). This dissertation uses a bottom-up approach to assess how the alleged legitimacy of monarchs impacted the behaviour, demands, and challenges of protesters. Ultimately, it seeks to uncover if this impact, if there is one at all, explains the resilience of these regimes. Resilience is not defined as the “absence of socio-political frictions and political schism” (Al-Rasheed, 10) but as survival of popular upheaval and the absence of regime change in spite of protests.

Case studies:

The case studies chosen are Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain between the early 2010s and 2012. The choice of these countries is motivated by their characteristics. In the academic literature, monarchies are often categorized as “Dynastic vs. Linchpin monarchies” (Yom, 2012; Barany, 2012). Morocco and Jordan are part of the Linchpin category because one individual rules (the King) and not the royal family at large (Lucas, 2004). The King usually participates only in the political institutions of the monarchy and not in the state bureaucracy (ibid). Their comparison is also interesting as both Kingdoms have a constitutional monarchy. Bahrain and other Gulf monarchies are dynastic monarchies, where “the ruling family monopolizes the highest state offices and controls the institutions of the state by distributing family members throughout the bureaucracy” (Herb 2012, 145). Therefore, these three cases enable us to examine if the legitimacy argument can be applied to both categories of monarchy. The choice of a Gulf monarchy will also permit the evaluation of the rentier-state argument. This dissertation’s limitation lies in the absence of comparison between monarchies and republics. However, the comparison between monarchies has been strategically chosen to prioritize depth over breadth.

Outline:

Chapter 1 explores the academic debate on the resilience of monarchies in more depth including the explanations and counterarguments suggested. The concept of legitimacy is also examined by answering some key questions: What do legitimacy/ illegitimacy mean? Is there such a thing as monarchical legitimacy? What are its various dimensions (religious, historical, cultural, performance)? Why is legitimacy important? How can legitimacy be measured? Chapter 2, 3, and 4 conduct an empirical analysis of the protests in Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain respectively. Each case identifies how the protests developed, their intensity, the kind of demands made, their outcomes, and most importantly: opinions on the monarchy. Chapter 5 compares the three cases, finding that legitimacy and regime responsiveness explaining why Jordan and Morocco have experienced relatively pacific, unchallenging uprisings. The responses of the regimes were vastly similar, yet citizen’s rationale for why they perceived their rulers as legitimate revealed some differences. The sectarian undertone of protests in Bahrain, the regime's brutal response, and the erosion of the social contract between the state and Bahrainis elucidate Bahrain’s high instability. The findings are also compared with those of the authors mentioned in the literature review. Finally, I conclude that, the Arab Spring revealed a monarchical advantage rather than a monarchical exception. While legitimacy and regime response played a fundamental role in taming the protests, the case of Bahrain has shown that, monarchies can lose their legitimacy, if their values do not conform to those they govern.

Chapter 1: Literature review and concepts

Huntington (1968) predicted the collapse of all monarchical regimes. In the 1960s, he stated that “modernizing monarchs are likely to hasten their own demise” (Huntingon, 1968, 191). The outcome of the popular upheaval which swept the MENA region in 2011 has proven the contrary. Many republics have faced regime change and those that did not such as Syria “had to use monstrous levels of violence in order to cling to power” (Snyder 2015, 1028). Bahrain is the only monarchy, which saw large protests occur and even there the rulers utilised less violence than their republican counterparts to stay in power (ibid). Protesters in Republics expressed a shared desire to overthrow the regime in place. Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Kaddafi were engulfed by discontent, in spite of the forestalling legal and political measures taken to secure their rule (Abulmajeed and Koprulu, 2018). Yom and Gause (2012) insist that the Arab uprisings of 2011 should be better described as the “Arab Republic’s spring” rather than identified as a phenomenon for the entire Arab world.

Rentier-state theory

Various explanations have been advanced to explain monarchical exceptionalism. The rentier-state argument suggests that, oil wealth helped monarchies build “powerful supporting coalitions of domestic interest groups, regional allies, and foreign patrons'' (Gause 2013, 8). Gause (2013) argued that, massive oil rents have been exploited in the Gulf by monarchs and their allies to invest in welfare initiatives aimed at taming public discontent about unemployment and other socio economic grievances. The Arab uprisings started at the end of a decade of relatively high oil prices (ibid). Oil revenues helped regimes lower fuel and food prices, create jobs, increase public salaries, and provide new welfare benefits (El-Katiri 2013). For example, Saudi Arabia announced economic hand-outs of more than 70 billion dollars in February 2011 to absorb social discontent (Al-Rasheed, 2012). This argument has been supported by some (Al-Rasheed, 2012; Bank et al., 2013), yet heavily criticized by others (Ross, 2011; Yom, 2012). The most common criticism lies in the failure of the oil wealth argument to explain the resilience of resource-poor Kingdoms such as Morocco and Jordan (Herb 2012). Despite receiving some financial aid from GCC countries, their resources are incomparable to those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or the UAE. Steinberg (2014) advanced that, it was not the oil wealth per se which kept the monarchs in power, but the way in which it was used: Libya is an oil-rich republic but its resources did not prevent regime change. Similarly, Yom (2012) points to the fact that President Mubarak would have been toppled just as certainly because $100 billion in oil revenues would have been insufficient to address the profound grievances of the protesters. Di John (2007) supported an opposite theory, which stipulates that, oil abundance can make the state more vulnerable to insurgency. When states earn the majority of their revenues from hydrocarbon resource rents, decision-makers are less in need of collecting domestic taxes, which in turn makes them less accountable to their populations (ibid, 4). Consequently, oil monarchies are prone to having weak state structures, because they do not need to establish robust bureaucracies to raise revenue (ibid). Weak institutional structures can make the state more vulnerable to insurgency and the lack of accountability can fuel discontent. (Karl 1997)

Foreign aid

Foreign aid, in different forms, has also been identified by some scholars as a cause for monarchical resilience (Louër, 2012; Yom, 2012; Legrand, 2012). The example of the unprecedented level of cooperation between Gulf countries such as in Bahrain, where fierce protests required the intervention of Saudi and Emirati troops is the most widely cited (Louër, 2012, 3). This argument suggests that monarchies would not have been as resilient had foreign intervention and alliances not supported them. In Yom’s (2012) own words, monarchies benefited from external support for being “linchipns of oil security and geopolitical stability” (1). For instance, the Jordanian monarchy has a duty to reassure foreign allies (by preventing regime change) such as the US and Saudi Arabia, because their financial aid is crucial for Jordan’s stability (Legrand, 2012). However, one could assert that, republics also needed to reassure foreign allies, and yet have not managed to do so.

Legitimacy

The most cited cause for monarchical resilience in the literature is the distinctive legitimacy attributed to monarchs in the region. Al-Dakhil (2011), Barany (2012), Hudson (2012) all claimed that, monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa are grounded in sacred Islamic ideals and/or classical tribal traditions, which give them a “special cultural authenticity with Arab Muslims that presidents and generals simply do not have” (Yom 2012, 2). Appealing to Islamic principles and traditions has enabled them to cultivate trust and to instil a sense of respect for a leader on the right path: “the Sunna” (Hudson, 167). In fact, the Jordanian Royal Islamic Strategic studies centre ranks the Saudi leaders first, Moroccan and Jordanian kings second and fourth respectively on the list of the world’s most influential Muslims (Barany 2012, 10). Accordingly, it is usually the networks of patronage, which are criticised while the monarch remains respected (Bercault, 2016). Assertions of historical and religious legitimacy give the monarch a holy character by reinforcing the belief in his right to rule (Greenblatt, 2011). In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has the status of ‘Commander of the faithful’, an implicit claim to divine legitimacy (ibid). The Hashemite in Jordan also claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad (Yom, 2012). In Saudi Arabia, a religious school of thought known as Hanbali “informs and justifies all royal decrees'' (Menaldo 2012, 711). The Al-Saud dynasty is also often referred to as the guardian of the two Holy mosques. (Almoneif, 2005). These statements decrease support for movements and groups which challenge the monarchy’s authority. As shown by Hudson (2012), monarchs who use religious symbolism are greeted by a receptive audience because Islam’s socio-political values and kinship have a deeply integrating function in Arab societies. As such, the monarchs are respected and considered to have a spiritual authority which should not be questioned (Al-Dakhil, 2011; Alianak, 2014). Beyond religious legitimacy, scholars like Al-Dakhil (2011) and Barany (2012) referred to historical dimensions of legitimacy. Historically, the longevity of the monarchies with the exception of Jordan grounds them in long-established socio-political traditions, values, belief systems, and institutions which give a sense of continuity to the population (Lewis, 2011). This historical legacy makes monarchical regimes “closer to the society that they govern” than republics (Gause, 2012, 8). For example, King Hussein often spoke of Jordan as a “family” (Hudson, 2012, 25). Moreover, the royals are often associated with national identity, whereas republican regimes gain their legitimacy through short periods of elections. In many cases, the monarchy is considered to be a part of the country’s “political DNA” (Keyman 2012, 2) and historically compatible with the society’s “value-impregnated beliefs that hold it together” (MacIver 1947, 4). Since monarchies are “traditional regimes that emerged from within their traditional societies” (Gause 2012, 6), they are considered to be concordant with the structure of their societies. The durability of these regimes has also constructed a sense of stability that the population values (Barany 2012). The explanation of monarchical resilience by this argument of legitimacy, in its different forms, is not without objections. Yom (2012) has frequently asserted his scepticism because “all regimes are inherently legitimate until overthrown” (1). He suggests that the argument creates a tautology and that it is extremely hard to operationalize and measure legitimacy (Yom 2012, 2).

Definition and concept of legitimacy

As outlined in the introduction, this argument around legitimacy deserves more scrutiny because it is one of the most widely cited yet it lacks empirical analysis. The term legitimacy has also been of high importance in political reflection, from the first works of Plato and Aristotle. There is no consensus on a single definition of legitimacy as some scholars even distinguish between Eastern and Western-centric perspectives (Gause, 2012). For instance, in the United States, legitimacy is associated to democratic elections and fair representation (Panitch, 2013). In the Islamic world, this is not necessarily the case. Legitimacy is more often than not, correlated with a regime’s longevity and sacred traditions (ibid). One of the first theories which emerged on the concept of legitimacy is that of Max Weber. According to Weber, there are three types of legitimate authority. Each type of legitimacy is based on legal grounds, traditional grounds, or charismatic grounds (Collins 1986). Legal grounds refer to obedience to normative rules and to a legally established impersonal order (Smith 1970, 21). Traditional grounds are closer to the characteristics of monarchical rule as they describe “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions'' (ibid, 18). Finally, charismatic grounds rest on the exceptional and exemplary character of an individual (ibid). Weber’s analysis can be analytically useful, because it considers legitimacy as a dynamic phenomenon rather than an internalised constant. He regards it as a continuous assessment of a leader or an institution’s grounds for authority at any given moment. However, Weber’s definition does not shed light on the qualitative differences between a stable monarchy and a stable democracy. Both regime types can incorporate a mix of legal, traditional, and charismatic claims to legitimacy, yet the form of governments would suggest qualitative differences in “the way members oriented themselves toward the political world” (Dahl, 1963, 30). As regime type matters significantly in this dissertation, it will not rely on Weber’s understanding of legitimacy. Instead, legitimacy is understood according to Alshammari and Zeyad’s (2017) definition as “the society’s belief that either the leader has a sacred right to rule or he or she is effective as a ruler” (22). In doing so, this definition will help show that a population will regard a political system as legitimate if it is compatible with its primary values (Seymour, 1959). It also bridges the gap between Eastern and Western perspectives as values can vary from one place to another. By focusing on the audience, this definition supports the bottom-up approach of this dissertation by reminding of the importance of the audience in determining the legitimacy of a regime. Conceptually, it is also important to have a closer look at the meaning of monarchical legitimacy. Naguib (2020) defines it as a culture around royalness or a set of shared values between monarchies. While this understanding is valid to some extent, it is crucial to remember that there are still differences between monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa. Legitimacy is a multidimensional construct which can include History, Religion, culture, and even performance (the extent to which a political system satisfies the basic functions of a government). Some dimensions can be present in some monarchies and absent in others.

Measuring legitimacy

While the debate on monarchical exceptionalism recognizes the importance of a legitimate authority in guaranteeing stability, many scholars have insisted on the difficulty in measuring it (Yom 2012; Gause, 2012; Al-Dakhil, 2013). However, methods and strategies to evaluate political legitimacy are well supported academically. Two main viewpoints exist: a macro outlook which emphasises formal system properties, and a micro perspective focusing on citizens’ attitudes and opinions (Dahl, 1956; Weatherford, 1992; Schoon, 2014). The macro approach measures political legitimacy by “how well institutions and officials discern -- or define -- and act on the polity’s best interests” (Pitkin 1967, chap 7). This method is not reliable because of its tendency to overemphasize aggregate processes and formal structures all the while dismissing public opinion. The importance of the audience and the choice of a bottom-up approach privileges a micro perspective to measure legitimacy by evaluating if the ruler, government or political system’s “actions or behaviours align with a particular set of norms or expectations'' (Schoon, 2015, 6). Therefore, in this dissertation, legitimacy is measured through empirical analysis of the protests during the Arab uprisings by analysing opinions expressed on the monarchs, satisfaction with their actions, slogans during the protests, as well as demands and the intensity of desire to change regime or to break the system in place.

Chapter 2: The case of Jordan

Introduction:

This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the Arab Spring in Jordan between 2011 and 2012. The start of the Tunisian revolution in December 2010 raised hope for political, economic, and social change in Jordan. Jordanians shared many grievances with protesters in other countries of the region. Economically, inflation rose in Jordan from 1.6% in 2003 to 13.9% in 2008 (IndexMundi, 2008). Unemployment reached 30% and poverty rates hovered around 13-14.2% in 2011 (Tobin 2012). The price of essential goods has been increased by 15% in six months only. Jordanians also complained about social services which were saturated after the arrival of 2 million refugees (Zecchini, 2011; Dorsey, 2018). Socio Economic grievances are not solely responsible for popular upheaval as Jordanians’ outspoken anger extended to political complaints over internet censorship, election fraud, government incompetence, and authoritarian governance (Ryan, 2018).

Timeline of protests:

Protests in Jordan began on January 14th 2011 when the popular union leader Mohammad Sneid called for demonstrations (Melik, 2011). Eight thousand Jordanians descendend the streets of Amman, Maan, Karak, Irbid and other cities to demand the resignation of prime minister Samir Rifai (Sandels, 2011). One week later, the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most important opposition movements, pushed for protesters to continue professing their anger against the political and economic situation in Jordan (Tobin, 2012). Demonstrations attracted approximately 3500 people from trade unions, the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as non-Islamist opposition parties (ibid, 101). Larger protests occurred in February demanding that, King Abdullah II expel the prime minister he newly appointed (Al-Bakhit) and whom they accused of not believing in democracy (Fordham, 2011). On February 18, a clash between protesters and groups of government supporters befell central Amman, requiring the intervention of the police to restore public order (BBC, 2011). This clash set the tone for other confrontations between Islamists and monarchy loyalists in April (ibid). Smaller pacific protests took place in June and July, with rare outbreaks of police violence. In 2012, demonstrations subsided (Hazaimeh, 2011). They only renewed in September 2012 in Amman and the Southern city of Ma’an to contest Prime Minister Al-Tarawneh’s decision to increase fuel prices by 10% (Kadri and Kershner, 2012).

Mobilization methods

Compared to the experiences of other states, protests in Jordan were relatively nonviolent. The Arab Spring in Jordan manifested online on social media and blogs and in frequent, contained demonstrations (Tobin 2012, 96). Protesters mimicked scenes in Cairo, and Tunis: “tents, sleeping bags, and food to allow for a round-the-clock presence” (Doughan, 2020, 1). Most protests consisted in sit-ins rather than violent expressions of discontent as was the case in Cairo’s Tahrir square. Demographically, half of the population is Palestinian and was reluctant to march the streets because of a shared concern about lassitude with Palestinian discontent (Tobin, 2012). Many Palestinians voiced this concern in interviews, indicating that “the Arab Spring was not their fight” (ibid, 98).

Demands

Jordanians had both political and socio-economic demands. Economically, widespread discontent about unemployment, inflation, and corruption sparked sit-ins early on (Barari and Satkowski, 2012). A prominent army officer, General Ali Habashneh affirmed: “There is corruption, a widening of the gap between rich and poor… Economic investment policies are destroying the country” (Fisk 2010). This concern was shared by many people including leaders of the opposition who criticized the aggressive fiscal policies of the government. Colourful banners with the inscription “send the corrupt guys to court” were seen around Amman (AlJazeera, 2011, para. 2). Voices were also raised against rising food and fuel prices and social inequality: “Jordan is not only for the rich. Bread is a read line. Beware of our starvation and fury” (Peel, 2011, para. 2). Politically, calls for a greater say in the Kingdom’s affairs were chanted (Dorsey, 2018). Weak democracy, limited individual and collective rights, along with a restrained freedom of expression were criticized in all segments of Jordanian society (CBC, 2011). The constitution gives King Abdullah II the exclusive power to choose prime ministers, judges and regional governors, as well as the right to dissolve parliament and to govern by decree (Salameh, 2018). Protesters demanded constitutional changes to limit his power and to have a prime minister elected from the parliamentary majority (Ryan, 2011). However, there were no demands for the departure of the King, not even from the main opposition: the Muslim Brotherhood. AlJazeera journalist Jane Arraf, who was in Amman in October 2012, confirmed that “hardly anyone was asking for the monarchy to be overthrown” (AlJazeera, 2012). Jordanians said that they wanted the King, only not a King who rules: “a monarch above the authorities just like the British, Belgian, and Spanish monarchy”. They wanted the monarch to keep his position as “a unifying force and arbitrator between the Palestinian and Bedouin communities”, only not under absolute rule (ibid). In other words, protesters demanded systemic change consisting in political participation and greater accountability. While protesters did not wish for the King to step down, they openly criticised the government members and urged prime ministers to resign (LeMonde, 2011).

Opinion of the monarchy

In Jordan, King Abdullah II has faced criticism, but even the most exasperated protesters hardly ever accused him for their poor living conditions (Sullivan 2011b, para. 7). He is considered to be above the political fray, a characteristic of monarchies which gives this regime type additional strength (ibid, 10). During an interview with Moroccan Prince Moulay Hicham, he insisted on this advantage of monarchichal rule arguing that “when you stand above politics, you become souple, and you can integrate different players in the game. It doesn’t become a zero sum game”. Protesters clearly indicated that they wanted large-scale reforms and not an end to Hashemite rule (Sullivan 2011b, 10). Loyalists even threatened activists on social media, calling them “Palestinian traitors” and interrupted many sit-ins “out of a sense of loyalty to country and King, which were construed as one and the same” (Doughan, 2020, 1). One Jordanian claimed during an interview that the King is a factor of stability. In fact, many firmly believe that “it would be a mess without the royal family” (Williams 2012, 4). The King is regarded as “the glue that holds a fragmented society together” (ibid, 7) and a symbol of the country’s national identity. The secretary general of the Islamic Front of Action, opposition party, insisted that, all they wanted were political and economic reforms under the supervision of the monarch (Zecchini, 2011). In the words of an activist: “Abu Husein is dear to us, we don’t accept another but reform and change is what everybody wants”. A Jordanian columnist at the popular journal Al Arab Al Yawm said that "Jordanians do not criticize the sovereign by wanting his overthrow: they denounce the clique that surrounds him" (Al-Khitan, 2011). While Bedouin tribes, the traditional backbone of the monarchy, protested for the first time, they insisted on their demand for reform only (Greenberg, 2011). However, people were less sympathetic to Queen Rania who was accused of corruption and criticized for “the lavishness of her birthday celebration” (Williams, 2012, 13). A letter has been written to the King declaring: “We still have loyalty to the Hashemite throne, but we believe that King Abdullah should stop his wife and her family from abuse” (ibid). Therefore, the King was hardly targeted but his wife was heavily criticised for her lifestyle.

Regime response and outcome of the protests:

The regime’s response has been moderately repressive, when compared to other countries in the region, and has instead focused on a reform process. King Abdullah II first replaced Prime Minister Samir Rifai by Marouf al-Bakhit, an ex-army general. Al-Bakhit was ordered to “take quick, concrete and practical steps to launch a genuine political reform process and to strengthen democracy" (Al-Hamad, 2014, 204). King Abdullah also demanded a reform of laws on public freedoms (Salameh, 2017). In February 2011, the Public Gatherings Law was changed to permit unlimited freedom of expression as the former law required authorization from the governor to carry any demonstration (ibid). Later in March, King Abdullah II appointed a committee including opposition figures to draft new election laws (Tobin 2012). He also affirmed in a speech that “no one is above the law or has impunity” to emphasise his responsiveness to the protests (Williams 2012, 19). As the opposition grew impatient, he commanded the establishment of the Royal Committee to review the constitution (RCRC). On June 12 2011, he renounced his right to nominate prime ministers and cabinets (Yesilurt, 2014). Instead, future cabinets are formed by parliamentary majority (Gavlak, 2011). The RCRC announced its proposal for constitutional changes in 42 articles which have been swiftly approved by the Parliament and the Senate. Major amendments to the Constitution included an independent commission “to supervise the parliamentary electoral process” (Art. 67) and new regulations limiting the government’s power (Art. 94) to issue temporary laws without the consent of the parliament (Yesilurt 2014, 172). Finally, the monarch’s right to adjourn parliamentary elections indefinitely was abolished.

Conclusion

Protests in Jordan were relatively small and nonviolent. Political and socio economic demands called for reform rather than regime change. The Hashemites have a great degree of legitimacy in the eyes of Jordanians. In fact, very few people were willing to imagine Jordan without its monarchy. The saying “the King is good; the political class is bad'' seems to apply to Jordan as, with the exception of Queen Rania, the monarchy was spared criticism. King Abdullah II reacted to the protests by reforming a third of the constitution. He fired three prime ministers in a year and a half and announced early elections in 2013. These reforms, along with the monarch's legitimacy, tamed the protests and contained the Kingdom’s experience of the Arab uprisings.

Chapter 3: The case of Morocco

Introduction:

In Morocco, King Mohamed VI had promised when he accessed the throne in 1999 a series of reforms to democratize the monarchy (Tlemçani, 2011). Many of these promises have been fulfilled including the amendment of family law in 2004, a greater commitment to gender equality, and the creation of a transitional justice committee to reconcile Moroccans with the Years of Lead, the period of high repressive rule of his father King Hassan II (Abouzzohour, 2020). However, this process of democratisation started to stall according to a group of young Moroccans who created “the February 20 movement” in 2011 (Desrues, 2011). An atmosphere of general discontent with freedoms and democracy, social inequality, corruption and individual rights preceded the creation of this movement and sparked social mobilization.

Timeline:

The February 20 movement defines itself as “a force of contestation independent of any political party, union, or organisation” (Moustaoui 2016, 9). It was created on the Moroccan blogosphere by political dissidents and extended to larger groups of youth who made use of social media to mobilize and organize the first protests. They created the twitter hashtag #20february referring to the date of the first protest to spread their anger and discontent with the public (Germain, 2013). Some organizations and parties started to express their support early on such as the Moroccan association for Human Rights, the unified socialist party, and the Islamist banned party Al Adl wa l’Ihssan (Justice and beneficience). On 20 February, protesters gathered in Rabat, the capital, in front of the parliament building. Other protests took place in cities like Casablanca, Marrakech, El Jadida, El Hoceima, Tetouan etc (BBC, 2011). In March, approximately 35 000 people held peaceful protests around the Kingdom. Demonstrations and sit-ins continued almost every Sunday in April and May, demanding constitutional reforms and better living conditions (Senna 2011). The largest public outcry took place on June 5th when 60 000 people in Casablanca and Rabat (Badran, 2018). The rapid response of the regime consisting in constitutional reforms voted by referendum, explained more expansively at the end of this chapter, halted the movement of protests (Lakrini, 2011). The Islamic legitimacy conferred to the new government elected in November 2011, led by the Islamist party of justice and development (PJD) also created hope for change, taming the popular discontent. However, in 2012, smaller protests resumed against the failed promises of Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, including failure to increase social equality and to address unemployment (AlJazeera, 2012).

Scope of mobilization:

Similarly to Jordan, protests were small when compared to the experience of other countries in the region. Most police interventions remained moderate in comparison to the brutal crackdowns in Syria, Egypt, or Libya (Reuters, 2011). Interviews with people who did not want to join the protests suggested a lack of faith in the movement. One interviewee said that, he believed that ‘change will come from organizations, not from the street” (Lawrence 2016, 10). Others insisted on their belief in peaceful change (ibid). In fact, after the first video of the February 20 movement was released, the movement was seen as “traitors who question the foundations of the nation: God, Homeland, and King” (Chraïbi and Jeghllaly, 2012, para. 25). Therefore, the protests were not as intense and serious as in neighbouring Tunisia for instance, both in terms of number of protesters and demands.

Demands:

Representatives of the February 20 movement declared they were looking for constitutional reforms and not for regime change. In their own words: “We do not wish at all that the situation degrades as in Libya or Syria. We want to have a soft revolution, and we have all the means to do so” (LeRoux, 2011). Osama El-Khilfi, one of the founders of the movement insisted that “their target is not the untouchable monarch, but the makhzen – the powerful, wealthy, and often hated power structure surrounding him” (Tremelett, 2011). The manifesto of the movement is also carefully worded so as not to imply a wish for the King’s departure. It asks for the King’s power in the constitution “to be of natural size” and to abolish his right to not be held responsible for his acts in front of justice (ibid). Protesters chanted slogans such as “A king who rules but who doesn’t govern” and “Homeland, God, Freedom, and dignity” (Moustaoui, 2016, 13). When university graduates protested in front of King Mohamed’s palace, they emphasized that it was “a social protest, not a political one” (Tremlett, 2011). However, the manifesto clearly made reference to political demands, only not about regime change. These demands included a democratic constitution, the end of the “makhzen” (the elite around the King), and a transparent government (Desrues, 2012). Economically, people asked for support to cope with rising living costs and for more transparency on the management of natural resources. Protesters also called for better health and education services along with increased employment (Allilou, 2014). To the difference of other countries, Moroccans also had demands linked to national identity. As such, the Berber population asked for more political representation and for the Berber language to become Morocco’s second official language after Arabic (Desrues, 2012).

Moroccans and the monarchy:

A poll conducted in 2009, two years before the Arab Spring, showed that ”over 90% of respondents approved of King Mohamed VI’s rule” (LeMonde 2009) . In 2011, citizens said that they “believe that the monarch has a special gift or blessing and they feel that they have some psychological relationship with the King” (Lewis 2011, para.10). These statements can explain why groups organised demonstrations against the February 20 movement to insist on the “sacredness of the values of the Moroccan monarchy”, chanting slogans like “God, Homeland and King” (Moustaoui 2016, 12). The King is considered to be a symbol of national unity and “the protector of the Kingdom’s territorial integrity” (Chahir 2019, 6). A closer look at testimonials on social media also shows great appreciation for the monarch: in a citizen’s own words “God’s gift to Morocco”. This is not to say that, there are no critics of the monarchy at all as these exist in any regime. However, these findings show that, the great majority of Moroccans have respect and trust for the King. In fact, critics in the population targeted the government and political elites mainly because the monarchy is not considered to be an obstacle to change (Abouyoub, 2012). As in Jordan, criticism targeted power structures around the King rather than him per se. The February 20 movement officially stated that, it has never considered the departure of the King, or “the existence of Morocco without a monarchical regime”. As a young activist mentioned “there must be a real separation of powers, but still there should be the King. There are thirty million Moroccans who love their King'' (Germain 2013, para.3). Therefore, these statements confirm an extensive degree of monarchical legitimacy in the eyes of Moroccans.

Outcome of the protests:

Similarly to Jordan, King Mohamed VI has responded swiftly to the calls of protesters, steering clear of the dramatic scenes of brutal repression witnessed in other Arab countries. He first appeared in a televised address to state his decision to uphold extensive constitutional reforms to improve democracy (AlJazeera, 2011). He then created a special commission, representing different political tendencies, to work on reforms to be voted under referdum in June. These reforms included adding Berber as an official language in Morocco along with the Hassani language spoken by Sahrawi tribes and reinforcing the parliament and prime minister’s executive authority (Maghraoui, 2011). Moreover, the religious and political authority of the King was to be separated by using the status of commander of the faithful religious matters only (ibid). A commitment to Human Rights on the political, economic, and social front has also been reasserted with promises of further reform (Dupret and Ferrié, 2011). However, contrary to what the movement wished for, the King was to remain the commander-in-chief of the military and the chair of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Security Council (Erlanger, 2011). Most reforms have been widely supported by Moroccans, yet some prominent figures of the protest movement rejected them and demanded a genuine democratic constitution and a parliamentary monarchy (Radi, 2011). They called for a mass boycott of the referendum (ibid). Calls for boycott have not been answered as the new constitution has been adopted by 98.50% of the voters amongst a participation rate of 72.36% (Desrues, 2012). Early parliamentary elections were held in November 2011, instead of the scheduled round of September 2012.

Conclusion:

The monarchy in Morocco has an extensive degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the population, albeit for more religious reasons than in Jordan. King Mohamed VI’s status of commander of the faithful does instil a sense of sacredness around his rule. According to the slogans, demands, and interviews of protesters, clear attachment to the figure of the King made the protest movement less confrontational. As in Jordan, the elite around the King was the target of criticism rather than him per se. However, the referendum’s results also indicate that, the monarch’s rapid, moderately repressive and reform-oriented response participated in disrupting the determination of people to protest because the suggested reforms brought hope for change. This can explain why representatives of the February 20 movement, dissatisfied with the reforms announced, have not convinced people to continue mobilising.

Chapter 4: The case of Bahrain

Introduction:

The roots of the protests of 2011 date back to the 1960s. Bahrainis have periodically organized demonstrations during the last decades to demand political, economic, and social rights. The Shia majority has long complained about “systemic discrimination”, accusing the government of marginalizing Shias and privileging Sunnis in terms of access to housing, employment, and social services. Shiite Muslims represent seventy per cent of the population and are governed by a Sunni monarchy. While sectarianism represents a major grievance of the protests in 2011, other conditions have fuelled the uprisings. In 2004, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights released a report which indicated that more than half of the population lived in poverty while the richest citizens held a compound wealth of more than 20 billion dollars. The polarization of wealth continued to worsen with the liberalization of real estate markets, inciting the anger of poor segments of society.

Timeline of protests:

The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia inspired Bahraini activists to call for pro-democracy protests on social media in January 2011. The official appeal encouraged Bahrainis “to take to the streets on Monday 14 February in a peaceful and orderly manner in order to rewrite the constitution and to establish a body with a full popular mandate". This day was highly symbolic as it represented the ninth anniversary of the Constitution of 2002, introduced by Sheikh Hamad to implement new democratic reforms, as a result of the 1990s uprisings. On February 4 2011, Bahrainis assembled in front of the Egyptian embassy in Manama to show their support of the anti-Mubarak demonstrations in Egypt. A few days later, a religious figure called for political activists to be released, the constitution to be rewritten, and for an end to practices of torture and discrimination. His speech set the tone for the official “day of rage” during which tens of thousands of Bahrainis came out to the streets, demanding political reforms while staying away from criticism of King Hamad. An open letter to the King was, however, written by the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights warning him to act swiftly to prevent a “worst-case scenario”. The first protests were immediately met by violence as security forces employed rubber bullets, birdshots, and tear gas to stop the demonstrations. Seeing the determination of protesters, the majority of whom were Shia, a lockdown was imposed on the capital with checkpoints, tanks, and armed soldiers to surveil. Casualties and injuries field the anger of protesters who continued demonstrating in spite of the regime’s repressive response. On February 25, the government announced a national day of mourning. Protests grew larger with an estimate of 40% of Bahrainis marching in the streets of Manama. In March, discontent with the regime’s response took a turning point: calls for an end to the monarchy’s rule started to echo in the streets. Alerted by these calls, King Hamad announced a three-month state of emergency. This announcement did not scare protesters away, however, the GCC intervention on March 16 of over 5000 Saudi and Emirai security forces made a great majority retreat. On March 9 2012, a year later, renewed calls for democratic reforms spread in the capital as citizens grew increasingly impatient about the reform promises of the King. In the words of Nabeel Rajab, president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights: it was “the biggest march in our history” as hundreds of thousands people demanded the downfall of the King.

Scope of mobilisation

The number of protesters varied between 150000 and 300000, significantly higher numbers than in other monarchies. The most serious demonstrations lasted for one month and four days, with occasional protests until March 2014. Police brutality contributed to making the Arab Spring in Bahrain extremely violent as protesters that were mostly pacific. In numbers, Bahrain has registered 93 deaths, 3000 wounded, 2900 arrests, and 500 exiles. Witnesses say that ambulances and hospitals have been assaulted by security forces, preventing health workers from saving many lives. In 2012, one year after the first protests, King Hamad admitted during an interview: “I regret the events of last year”. In fact, police brutality is what motivated many people to join the protests. An interview with Ahmed Mohammed, an activist revealed that the police’s violent response made him feel compelled to get involved. In his own words: “By then, I thought, okay, that’s it, I can’t stay at home. I can’t live with myself staying at home.” The government of Bahrain is the only one which requested foreign intervention during the Arab Spring. A request which is very telling of the level of instability the country experienced in 2011. On March 14, the Gulf Cooperation Council deployed troops of the Peninsula Shield Force. As the capital Manama harbors a US navy base, 1500 American soldiers were deployed at the same time.

Demands of the protesters:

Nabeel Rajat who helped to organise the protests declared that, the movement was “only asking for political reforms, right of political participation, respect for human rights, a stopping of systematic discrimination against Shias". A closer look at the slogans and banners reveals more information on the precise demands called for in the streets: democracy, a constitutional monarchy, fair elections and freedom, as well as deportation of foreign mercenaries. Economically, slums in Bahrain were hotbeds of discontent, their mere existence being quite unusual for the region. In fact, demands for employment were the most widespread amongst the protesters. Criticism of access to employment is one of the many grievances associated with sectarianism. Qadiri (2015) interviewed more than three hundred Bahrainis, 72% of whom affirmed that “the most significant contributing factor to the uprising in that state during Arab Spring was sectarian conflict.” They perceived that economic deprivation, the lack of civil liberties, and the unequal access to social services were all ramifications of the Shia/Sunni divide.

Bahrainis and the monarchy:

The Al-Khalifa dynasty has been in power in Bahrain for over 200 years. The backbone of the monarchy is the Sunnis who rallied behind the King as the uprisings took on an increasingly sectarian tone. Initially, the protests have not criticized the rule of King Hamad. The large opposition group Al-Wefaq made clear demands for a constitutional monarchy rather than a call for regime change. While the monarchy has been relatively spared of criticism at the start of demonstrations, police brutality and violence represented a turning point. By then, “the change in slogans was clear”. Hard-line Shia groups started to call for the abdication of King Hamad and the institution of a democratic republic. Some protesters began shouting “down with the King, down with the Khalifas''. The violence of security forces was the catalyst for deeper discontent with the King, notably about his policy of massive naturalization of foreign Sunnis to balance the Shia/Sunni ratio of the population. King Hamad was well aware of these demands: during an Interview in 2012, he was asked “Your Majesty, what would happen if we were to shout: "Down with the King?". He responded that “They do shout it on the streets. The problem is not that, it’s when they say “Down with the king and up with Khomeini," that's a problem for national unity.” His concern was seemingly not about the calls for abdication per se, rather, he worried about the influence of Iran on Bahrainis given the uprisings’ sectarian undertone.

Hydrocarbon wealth and the protests:

In February 2011, King Hamad announced on local channels that each Bahraini family would be given a thousand Bahraini dinars along with the creation of 20000 jobs. These measures were undertaken to tame the protests and growing discontent of citizens. Rentier-state theorists have attempted to explain the resilience of oil-rich monarchies by these economic initiatives. However, in comparison to the efforts of Saudi Arabia, the government in Bahrain has not invested as much in welfare initiatives aiming at taming popular upheaval. Saudi Arabia handed out more than 70 billion dollars and packages of benefits to “absorb immediate frustration at lack of housing, jobs, health facilities, and welfare services. “ In contrast, Bahrain is not as oil-rich as its neighbours. In fact, the Kingdom has sought to renegotiate the bases of its social contract beyond rentierism ever since the 1970s. Therefore, economic hand-outs in Bahrain have not had the same impact on protesters as in other Gulf monarchies. Had these initiatives reached the efforts of Saudi Arabia, they might even have been insufficient to address the profound sectarian grievances of the population.

Outcome of the protests:

King Hamad responded to the uprisings by offering concessions such as the release of political prisoners and dismissal of three ministers. This response was considered insufficient by the majority of protesters who sought extensive democratising reforms. On March 13th, the crown prince released a statement “outlining seven principles to be discussed in a political dialogue, including "a parliament with full authority" and "a government that represents the will of the people''. Later in May, the King officially called for a national dialogue to take place in July, representing “a forum for the discussion and promotion of reform.” However, the national dialogue reached an impasse as protesters grew pessimistic about any prospect of real change. He also created the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry to conduct an investigation on violations of Human Rights in the country, especially during February-March 2011. Unsatisfied by the regime’s response, many MPs submitted their resignation from parliament. Some of them have accused the government of trying to cement divisions in society, a divide-and-rule strategy judged unacceptable. Elections took place in September 2011 to replace the MPs who resigned, a large majority belonging to the opposition party Al Wefaq. Some protests continued sporadically to contest the “insufficient” response of the regime. However, the uprisings in Bahrain progressively lost their momentum both as a result of the regime’s repressive measures and a growing loss of hope for democratisation.

Conclusion:

In contrast to Jordan and Morocco, Bahrain has experienced very challenging uprisings. The sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shias along with the erosion of the welfare state prompted a crisis of legitimacy of the regime. While demands cantered around reform only initially, the brutal crackdown of protesters and use of repressive measures that have changed these demands into calls for regime change. The correlation between Bahrain’s high instability during the Arab Spring and the Al-Khalifa dynasty’s crisis of legitimacy suggests the importance of an audience’s belief in legitimate rule, beyond claims made by the regime.

Chapter 5: Findings and discussion of the case studies

The case studies presented in the previous chapters have shown similarities and differences in the development and outcome of the protests, as well as the perception of the monarchical regime in place. Bahrain weathered the Arab Spring very differently from Jordan and Morocco as the monarchy has been openly criticized with extensive calls for King Hamad to abdicate. Three important factors can explain the case of Bahrain: demography, long-standing demands for reform, as well as high police brutality. Firstly, the ethnic balance of the population in Bahrain is not the same as in Jordan and Morocco. The majority of the population is Shia and has long felt unrepresented, discriminated, and oppressed by the Sunni minority in power. King Hamad’s policy of massive naturalisation of Sunni foreigners, aimed at balancing the Sunni to Shia ratio of the Kingdom, has fuelled sectarian tensions. These grievances were not present in Jordan and Morocco, which can partially explain why King Mohamed VI and King Abdullah II were less challenged. Arguably, Jordan also has a peculiar demographic situation with Palestinians accounting for 50% of its population. However, religious tensions in Jordan are much less significant than in Bahrain. The presence of Palestinians has even played in favour of the regime because of their reluctance to join the protests, which were “not their fight” (Tobin, 2012, 98).

Regime response

Another important factor elucidating the case of Bahrain is the highly repressive response of the regime. Initially, citizens have not called for King Hamad to abdicate. However, police brutality represented a turning point in their demands. Security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets on protesters, captured ambulances, and attacked health workers, who were saving the victims. Scenes of violence prompted the most reluctant citizens to join the protests to express both their anger at the government’s response and their solidarity with the victims. As shown by Bischof and Fink (2015), moderate repression has a deterring effect when it “raises the costs of rebellion” (ibid, 376). However, this deterring effect disappears “if repression is used indiscriminately” (ibid). King Hamad and his family have been criticized for their inaction and silent witnessing of security forces’ violent repression. The decision to ask the GCC to intervene illustrates the loss of control over confrontations between the police and citizens. In comparison, protests and the regime’s response in Jordan and Morocco was relatively nonviolent (Tobin, 2012, 96). Moreover, Bahrain has been unable to buy-off peace like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies because its hydrocarbon reserves are greatly depleted. The small remaining petroleum wealth does not provide the population with “the gold-plated social security programs of its neighbours”. On the contrary, it is systematically redistributed to the Sunni elite. As shown by rentier-state theorists, many countries in the Gulf contain demands for democratization by redistributing hydrocarbon rents to their populations and giving them access to social services. It seems that, the progressive erosion of the welfare state and non-inclusive governance of Bahrainis is forcing the regime to renegotiate the foundations of its social contract. The Arab Spring in Bahrain has revealed the regime’s crisis of legitimacy, which, as it will be seen later, reinforces the importance of legitimacy in guaranteeing stability. Jordan and Morocco share many similarities in how they experienced and responded to the Arab Spring. In the Kingdoms, the government and power structures around the monarchy were the targets of criticism rather than the King per se. Interviews and testimonials have revealed attachment to and appreciation of the monarchy. Demands cantered around reform rather than revolution. The Hashemite and Alaouite monarchy were both considered not only legitimate in the eyes of their people but also critical in guaranteeing stability and unity. Empirical analysis reveals, however, that the regimes’ rapid and less violent response also played an important role in the development of smaller demonstrations. Both King Mohamed VI and King Abdullah II responded swiftly to calls for reform. Their rapid response avoided “the indecision and dramatic scenes of repression seen in other Arab capitals.” A few months after the start of the protests, the monarchs reformed approximately a third of their constitutions and held early elections. Reforms reduced the power of the King, deepened democratization and rationalised some state institutions. While these changes were criticised and considered insufficient by some groups, they still tamed protests by bringing hope for further change.

Legitimacy

The case of Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain suggests that legitimacy, in conjunction with regime response, explains monarchical resilience during the Arab uprisings. However, contrary to what the existing literature contends, there is no one-type established legitimacy which is common to all monarchies. Some monarchies’ legitimacy stands on more religious than historical grounds. Others legitimize their rule by their performance through extensive welfare programs or by creating a societal culture which links the monarchy to the state’s national identity. In Morocco, the King’s status of Commander of the Faithful confers the monarchy a religious legitimacy which is not as prevalent in Jordan, despite the Hashemite monarchy’s descent from the Prophet. Many protesters insisted on the sacred values of the Moroccan monarchy by chanting in the streets: “God, Homeland and King” (Moustaoui, 2016, 12). In fact, the example of Jordan has also shown that, the way a monarchy defines its legitimacy does not always correspond to why the population sees it as legitimate. While the Jordanian monarchy uses religion to legitimize its rule, little has been said about religion and descent when protesters expressed their opinion on the royals. Instead, profound attachment to the monarchy as a historical guarantor of stability and national unity is what transpired in the population’s responses. Given the importance of the audience in defining legitimacy, this suggests that the literature overemphasizes King Abdullah II’s religious grounds for legitimacy. This difference in audience perception between Morocco and Jordan can also be explained by their respective history. The monarchy in Morocco has had religious rituals and symbols for 700 years whereas the Hashemites have ruled in Jordan since 1921 only. An important similarity between Jordan and Morocco is that people shared a sense that it would be “a mess without the royal family”. The King is seen as “the glue that holds a fragmented society together” (Williams, 2012, 7). During an interview with Prince Moulay Hicham of Morocco, he shared an interesting insight on the reasons behind this perception. He argued that, the people everywhere in the MENA region yearn for change, but they also want order. They are averse to chaos and violence and they have understood what regime change can mean. In a monarchy, you can have reform without regime change “and so the story goes that you can have the best of both worlds”. In other words, people have learned that regime change comes with a very high price. A republic cannot be reformed in the same way but a monarchical regime represents a compromise that gives both order and the possibility of change. While this argument is very compelling, it leaves a fundamental question unanswered: what happens when people lose hope in the possibility of change? This question suggests that, populations might not be totally averse to disorder if their calls for change remain unanswered for too long.

Crisis of legitimacy

Scholars who contend that the case of Bahrain undermines the legitimacy argument fail to see the crucial insights given by the Khalifas’ experience of the Arab Spring. Firstly, it has revealed that the regime in Bahrain has a different strategy of legitimisation. Instead of making claims to religious or historical legitimacy, the monarchy privileges delegitimising any rising opposition through a divide and rule strategy. The stability of the regime in previous years has had more to do with the absence of a real opposition than with a genuine support of the monarchy. However, this strategy has been a double edged sword because it has fuelled sectarian tensions. Critics could argue that this strategy is used in other regimes in the region. Still, it is used to a much lesser extent and in conjunction with popular support for the monarchy. Low support for the Al-Khalifas in Bahrain can be explained by the gap between the values of the monarchy and that of the population. As outlined in the introduction, groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primarily values (Seymour, 1959). The majority of the population is Shia and represented by a Sunni minority with different religious values and traditions. Monarchies usually represent the culture of the country and its values. As such, “they become the centre of amplification of everything that’s cultural” (Moulay Hicham, interview, 2021). Since, they are usually the products of their societies, these look up to them as their representatives. This fundamental gap between society and monarchy in Bahrain makes the Shia majority feel misrepresented. Yet this does not mean that, the case of Bahrain undermines the legitimacy argument. On the contrary, it sheds light on the consequences of a crisis of legitimacy: a bottom-up desire for regime change. The absence of a rapid reform process like in Jordan and Morocco, combined with violent repression has reinforced this desire for revolution. Therefore, the case of Bahrain has demonstrated that, legitimacy plays an important role in the resilience of monarchies but that it is not imperishable. Without continuous efforts to make the values of the monarchy correspond to those of society, legitimacy can be lost.

Conclusion

This dissertation explored whether the legitimacy of monarchies explains their resilience during the Arab uprisings. It has found that, both legitimacy and regime response mattered significantly in determining the development and outcome of protests. The aim of this paper was to contribute to the literature on the Arab Spring and monarchical exceptionalism by undertaking a bottom-up approach to evaluate whether the people truly perceived monarchs as legitimate and for what reasons, and how this perception impacted their demands and behaviour. The academic literature comparing the experience of monarchies and Republics during the Arab Spring focused on the argument that monarchies are inherently more legitimate, taking at face value the regimes’ claims to legitimacy without evaluating the perspective of citizens. Legitimacy has been found to be a defining factor in the absence of calls for regime change yet this paper has challenged the claim that all monarchies are seen as legitimate for the same reasons. There is no standard legitimacy, which can be applied to all monarchical regimes. Empirical analysis of the case of Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain has revealed that protesters expressed a different degree to which history; religion, culture, and even performance informed their appreciation of the monarchy. Finally, the Bahraini regime’s crisis of legitimacy has stressed the necessity of nuancing the argument on a “monarchical exception” by speaking instead of a monarchical advantage. Bahrain’s intense experience of the uprisings, when compared to Jordan and Morocco has shown that legitimacy can be lost and is not an imperishable attribute of monarchical rule. In the first chapter, I explored the academic debate on the resilience of monarchies during the Arab uprisings, defining resilience as the absence of regime change rather than the absence of socio-political upheaval. The literature drew essentially upon the rentier-state argument, the role of Foreign aid, and the significance of monarchical legitimacy. I presented these in conjunction with their main counter-arguments and proceeded to explain the rationale behind my focus on legitimacy: the absence in the literature of empirical analysis focusing on the opinion of the audience of regimes. Then, I studied the concept of legitimacy in its various dimensions and expressions and defined it as “the society’s belief that either the leader has a sacred right to rule or he or she is effective as a ruler” (Alshammari 2017, 22). Various macro and micro approaches to measuring legitimacy were shown to exist, yet I have taken a micro perspective to analyse the perception of the monarchical regime as legitimate through the behaviour, slogans, and demands of protesters. The second, third, and fourth chapter analysed the Arab Spring in Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain respectively by looking at the development of protests, their intensity, the demands of protesters, their opinion of the monarchy, and the outcomes of the uprisings. I found that Jordanians considered the Hashemite monarchy as legitimate and were unwilling to imagine their country without it. This opinion greatly tampered the demands of protesters which cantered around calls for reform rather than regime change. King Abdullah’s swift response, reforming a third of the constitution, also played an important role in making social mobilization rapidly subside. Similarly, the chapter on Morocco has revealed that the Alaouite monarchy enjoys a great degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the population, albeit for more religious reasons than Jordan. The quick reform process that he commanded undermined the determination of protesters, who decided to step down, in spite of the calls of the leaders of the Feb 20 movement to continue mobilisation. In Bahrain, I explained the occurrence of challenging protests and the rise of demands for regime change by the sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shias, the erosion of the welfare state and the repressive response of the regime. Finally, I used the fifth chapter to compare and contrast my findings with those of the academic literature to determine whether legitimacy stood out as an explanation of resilience. I found that Jordan and Morocco had similar experiences of the Arab uprisings because protests were small and relatively nonviolent. Protesters in both countries criticised the elite around the King rather than the monarch himself as the latter was greatly appreciated by the majority. Moreover, the nonviolent, rapid, and reform-oriented response of the regime led to their quick demise. By contrast, the Bahraini monarchy has faced violent and large protests which openly called for regime change. I explained this variation by the regime’s crisis of legitimacy. This crisis has been caused by the sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis, the highly repressive response of the regime, which encouraged the protesters to retaliate and the absence of a reform process. Further research on how monarchies can maintain their legitimacy “advantage” can be interesting to explore.