Unrecognized Statehood

Chapter 1: Introduction

One of the issues that continues to see much debate and discourse in international law is that of statehood; this is especially true when statehood and self-determination become conflated and entities demand that their manifested self-determination of statehood be also recognised by other states in international law. As the cases of Palestine, Tibet and Kosovo (to name a few) have shown, the self-determined statehood status of a people does not always get recognition in international law. This may be because of the entity not demonstrating that it has the indicia of statehood, but many a times the lack of recognition is engendered due to political causes as seen in the cases of Tibet and Kosovo. Two points can be made out with regard to this at the outset. First, some entities may not be recognised as states despite their self-determined manifestation of such status because they may not satisfy the indicia of statehood. Second, in some cases, the indicia of statehood notwithstanding, political factors may be responsible for the entity being denied recognition in international law. Indeed, for entities that claim that they have achieved statehood, it becomes challenging for them to establish that they have attained the indicia of statehood as it is not necessary that they are able to achieve each indicator. International law recognises self-determination, but also requires the achievement of the indices of statehood for formal recognition. For students facing challenges in political topics to move towards the direction of seeking guidance to resolve all of them. they like taking assistance from Politics Dissertation Help as it is highly advanced in delivering valuable insights.

In this dissertation, a critical analysis will be conducted of the current practices and law around statehood in international law in context of self-determination. The central argument of this dissertation there is a need to re-evaluate the current law on statehood and recognition. Chapter 2 of the dissertation is the literature review which focuses on the academic debates in this area and links these back to your the central argument. This chapter discusses how the academics discuss the current problems of achieving statehood in international law by focussing on international law concepts of statehood and self-determination. Chapter 3 of the dissertation discusses the current law and practices around recognition of statehood against the background of the self-declaration of statehood by entities. Chapter 4 discusses the social, political and human rights issues that are associated with the recognition of statehood or the absence thereof. This is the more critical aspect of this dissertation as it looks into the problems that are resultant for an entity and its population due to non recognition of statehood. A conclusion based on the three chapter is drawn out in Chapter 5, which is the final chapter in this dissertation.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Conceptualisation of statehood in international law

Article 1 of the Montevedeo Convention, contains the definition of state in international law as per which a state is “a person of international law” that possesses a permanent population, has a defined territory, is run by a government; and has the capacity to enter into relations with other states. It is this definition of statehood that also lays down the recognised indicia in international law that an entity should possess for it to be a state under international law. For entities that are not states but identify themselves as such, it is necessary that they are able to establish these indicia for recognition. While this may appear to be simple, the post World War II history demonstrates that often conflicted terrain of statehood for new entities.

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1. Bridget Coggins, Power politics and state formation in the twentieth century: The dynamics of recognition (Cambridge University Press 2014).
2. Nathaniel Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-determination and international law’ (1988) 7 Wis. Int'l LJ 51.
3. Yael Ronen, ‘Entities that can be states but do not claim to be’ in Duncan French (ed.), Statehood and Self-determination: reconciling tradition and modernity in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013).

One of the issues identified in literature is that it defines a status that came post facto of entities being states. In other words, states have existed for a long time but it is only in recent international law have the definitions of statehood been identified based on the qualities that the existing states possessed. One may argue then that the definition of states based on the existing prototypes of states, predominantly in Europe, are not able to take into consideration the newer formations of states in the post war era when many entities were emerging out of colonial rule and declaring themselves to be states as per the manifestation of their self-determined status of statehood. However, many a times, such self-determined statehood has come in conflict with the similar determination of the parent states; unilateral declarations of independence therefore, like in the case of Kosovo presents difficulties that are not addressed by the conceptualisation of statehood based on the European experience in the previous centuries.

In the twenty first century, statehood has been conceptualised in different ways: a power system, or a welfare system, or a legal system, or as a nation. When such diverse explanations of ‘state’ exists in the literature, it is difficult to argue that only one kind of definition of states would be recognised in international law for the purpose of recognising states in international law. In other words, when the entity and its people recognise themselves as an independent political entity, can the international community deny such status? There then is a discrepancy in the acceptance of self-determination as a principle and the manner in which entities are recognised as states or denied such recognition. Examples that show how entities may fail to achieve international recognition as states despite manifest self-determination on statehood include Biafra in Nigeria, and Palestine, which even has an elected government in Gaza and the West Bank, but whose statehood is not internationally recognised.

Cases of entities like Palestine and Biafra show that there is a gap between a people perceiving their statehood and the perception or determination of the international community suggest that there is a controversy with respect to statehood due to unclear law of statehood or political factors that affect the recognition of statehood. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the concept of statehood and recognition also because of the social and legal effects of non-recognition. These are also discussed in the literature and will be discussed later in this essay. At this point, the literature on conceptualisation of statehood is being discussed.

Declaratory and constitutive approaches to statehood

One of the important questions relates to whether statehood a matter of fact or law and there is no consensus on this point. For instance, Oppenheim has argued that statehood is a matter of fact, meaning that whether state is formed or not is factual issue. This approach would help the cause of entities like Palestine and Biafra because the existence of the statehood in their cases will not depend on legal analysis but on factual analysis. This is central to the declaratory theory of statehood, which is a realist approach on the basis of the futility of denial of existence of state that exists factually or legal recognition of an entity that does not exist as a state. On the other hand, those who support the constitutive theory of statehood argue that statehood is a matter of law. From this perspective, existence of statehood is premised on recognition in law. This would mean that entities may be accorded or denied recognition based on the discretion of the recogniser and such recognition would constitute statehood. This is problematic for entities like Biafra and Palestine, where despite the establishment of indices of statehood, recognition is not as yet achieved by the entities concerned.

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4. Joseph R. Strayer, On the medieval origins of the modern state (Princeton University Press 2005).
5. James Crawford, The creation of states in international law (Oxford University Press 2006).
6. Robert Morrison MacIver, The modern state (Read Books Ltd. 2013).
7. Tekena N Tamuno, ‘Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914’ (1960) vii The Journal of Modern African Studies 563; David A Ijalaye, ‘Was “Biafra” at Any Time a State in International Law?’ (1971) 65(3) American Journal of International Law 551; Anthony Williams Amamkpa and Paul Uche Mbakwe, ‘Conflict Early Warning Signs and Nigerian Government Response Dilemma: The Case Of Increasing Agitations for Statehood by Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASOB)’ (2016) 1 African Journal of History and Archaeology 10.
8. Shadi Sakran, The Legal Consequences of Limited Statehood: Palestine in Multilateral Frameworks (Routledge 2019).
9. James Crawford, The creation of states in international law (Oxford University Press 2006) 3.

Therefore, whether statehood is a matter of fact or a matter of law is one of the core problems or issues related to the concept of statehood. The problem or issue goes to the root of the condition of entities declaring themselves to be states, having indices of statehood as under the Montevedeo Convention and still not being recognised as states in international law. In some situations, like Palestine, there are also established relations with other states yet statehood is ambiguous because the majority of the international community of states have not recognised their statehood.

The notion that statehood is factual as argued by Oppenheim, leads on to another issue or question related to the difference between capacity and status of statehood. The former is related to the factual conditions that indicate that an entity is a state because it has the capacity of statehood, while the latter is related to the legal condition of non recognition. Literature reveals a gap between capacity of statehood and status of statehood as seen in the experience of entities like Palestine and to some extent Taiwan. As of now, literature does not indicate that there is a standard practice by states as far as the recognition of statehood of other entities is concerned, making the area of statehood very complex. Added to this is the problem that there is no academic consensus on this issue.

Entities’ claims to statehood can be unique in context of capacity and status; entities can claim statehood without meeting all the indices, such as, Northern Cyprus. In this case it can be said that the entities lack capacity. Entities may meet indices of statehood but do not claim statehood or are not recognised as such, revealing lack of status. Thus, quasi states can exist without recognition. As of now there is no standard state practice or academic consensus on when entities can claim statehood.

Non- recognition: a part of the constitutive approach

Another issue that is explored in literature on statehood when conflated with the concept of self-determination is that of the impacts of the non-recognition of statehood for the people or the entity that manifest their statehood through self-determination. Literature suggests that impacts of non- recognition include oppressive and negative impacts on the local populations. Impacts can be social, political, and economic, as depicted in the Palestinian case, where oppressive policies, including embargo and blockade, impact the daily lives of the Palestinian people.

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10. Ibid, 4.
11. Yael Ronen, ‘Entities that can be states but do not claim to be’ in Duncan French (ed.), Statehood and Self-determination: reconciling tradition and modernity in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 23.
12. Ibid.
13. Michael G Kearney, ‘Why statehood now: A reflection on the ICC’s impact on Palestine’s engagement with international law’ in Is There a Court for Gaza (The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2011).
14. Ibid

A problem with the constitutive approach to statehood as contrasted with the declaratory approach is that the former shows the influence of political factors and discretion or even arbitrariness in how some entities are denied statehood even when they have the elements of statehood or satisfy the indices of statehood under international law. In some cases like Taiwan or the Republic of China, the problems are still complex. While Taiwan is an independent and sovereign state, its political status as a state is undecided due to China’s non-recognition of Taiwan’s statehood. It has international relations with about 14 countries in the United Nations as many countries do not want to upset China by having relations with Taiwan. Taiwan is not a member of many international organisations including the United Nations and the World Health Organisation due to the lack of recognition of its status as a state. Yet, Taiwan clearly exhibits all the markers of indices of statehood under international law including under the Montevedeo Convention. It has permanent territory, government, population and the ability and capacity to enter into relations with other states. Despite these, its independence and sovereignty is moot because of political reasons.

Clearly there is a problem and ambiguity associated with the concept of statehood and it cannot be said that statehood and its recognition is definite once the entity achieves the indicia of statehood. The actual state practice indicates that the reasons for why states recognise others are political and demonstrate a level of arbitrariness. For those entities that consider themselves to be sovereign, independent states, the lack of recognition by the international community can present serious problems, including the continued tyranny of oppressive rulers who may continue to demand international recognition of their government when a people have self-determined against being subject to the government. Or the continued statelessness and lack of human rights and dignity as in the case of Palestine. With respect to Palestine, although there are controversies related to whether or not Israel occupation of Palestinian territory is legal, the facts show that there is a case made out for statehood by Palestine. This is explained by John Quigley who argues that based on the historical facts, international community too acknowledges Palestinian statehood and encourages the goal of two coexisting independent states, Israel and Palestine.

Quigley argues that the League of Nations arrangements with regard to Palestine in 1924 suggests strongly that Palestine was a state in 1924 and remained a state after Israeli annexation in 1948. If that is the case, then why is Palestine not accorded the status of statehood through recognition? Does Palestine lack some markers of indicia of statehood in international law or are the reasons for denial of recognition by many states based on political factors? On the other hand, Israel obtained early recognition of statehood in 1948 itself. There is a different treatment to two different entities in the case of Israel and Palestine, which suggest that apart from the factual or legal basis of statehood, there may also be a political basis for statehood. An argument to this end is made by Agné et al, who write that through the concept of recognition of statehood, political realities and compulsions of states giving or withholding recognition is also depicted. In that sense, recognition plays a multifaceted role as it is used for the legal creation of new states and exercising policy choices.

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15. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Future of Statehood’ (1991) 32 Harv. Int'l. LJ 397.
16. John Quigley, The statehood of Palestine: international law in the Middle East conflict (Cambridge University Press 2010), preface.
17. Hans Agné, Jens Bartelson, Eva Erman, Thomas Lindemann, Benjamin Herborth, Oliver Kessler, Christine Chwaszcza, Mikulas Fabry, and Stephen D. Krasner, "Symposium ‘The politics of international recognition’ (2013) 5 (1) International Theory 94.

On the other hand, it has been argued that the Montevideo Convention no longer provides an appropriate or relevant explanation of statehood; this argument is put forth in terms of the Grotian Moment. The argument is that the Montevideo Convention is no longer adequate to define statehood through the four criteria of territory, government, population, and the capacity to engage in international relations. In the contemporary period, an entity can only qualify as a state, if it meets additional criteria over and above the criteria specified in the Montevideo Convention. These additional criteria include recognition by regional partners and powerful states, as well as commitment to participate in international organisations, and to abide by a set world order.

Thus, recognition becomes part of the legal requirements of statehood and without it, there is no statehood. This is an argument that supports the constitutive theory and goes against the declaratory theory of statehood as propounded by Oppenheim. Is this a more relevant explanation of statehood at this time, and if so, what are the problems that are associated with this approach to statehood? These are also some of the questions that are considered in the literature.

The case law of the International Court of Justice reflects some of the confusions or grey areas associated with law of recognition where despite acceptance of the principle that entities can self-declare statehood, the actual practice does not support statehood without recognition by other states. For instance, with reference to Kosovo, the court recognised the right to self-determination for declaring independence. However, Kosovo does not have UN membership and more than half of UN states do not recognise it. The dichotomy is between ICJ recognition of right to self-determination, and the international law practice sees emphasis on recognition. Similar dichotomy can be seen in the national courts; for instance, in Re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada recognised the right to self-determination but rejected Quebec’s statehood bid. These cases expose the problems that are associated with the lack of clarity on when entities achieve statehood, and its link to recognition and the lack of it.

Chapter Three: Discussion

In the previous chapter, this dissertation discussed the literature on the area of statehood and recognition in international law. The literature review found that although the constitutive theory is not generally accepted, recognition, especially collective recognition can play a significant role in determining statehood in international law or at least in determining whether or not an entity will enjoy the advantages that are associated with statehood in international law. This is so because even if scholars argue that recognition does not play a constitutive role in statehood, it does play a role in determining the relations between the entity and the other states. Even if an entity clearly demonstrates attributes of statehood, and other states do not accord it recognition, there will be absence of international legal relations between this entity and the other states. There are two points that are made out that are crucial to arguing that the current international law on recognition is not clear and is arbitrary, and needs further reassessment and development. The first is that there are obvious gaps in the constitutive approach and the second is that there are serious ramifications of the non-recognition of the entity, which reinforces the argument that there is a need for reassessment of the law and practice.

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18. Milena Sterio, ‘A Grotian moment: changes in the legal theory of statehood’ (2010) 39 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 209, 209- 210.
19. Ibid.
20. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), General List No. 141, 22 July 2010.
21. Jure Vidmar, ‘Kosovo: Unilateral Secession and Multilateral State-Making’ in J. Summers (ed.), Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights (M Nijhoff 2011).
22. Burkina Faso v. Mali, ICJ reports, (1986) 80 ILR; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, paragraph 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 2004 (I), pp. 171-172
23. Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR.

The difference between the declaratory and constitutive theory of statehood is that while the former is premised on the objective classifications of the Montevideo Convention 1933, the latter is premised on the notion that statehood is based on the recognition of the state by the international community. For many states that are new or whose founding is controversial in some ways, the constitutive theory presents problems as seen in the case of Palestine for example. Academic discussion is not able to provide a clear answer to the problem because the two theories of state recognition, the declaratory and constitutive theories, show disparity in the importance given to recognition disparately. Therefore, in academic literature, there is no consensus on the role played by recognition in the constitution of the statehood; for declaratory theory, the role of recognition is not qualifying whereas in the constitutive theory, recognition plays a qualifying role. This means that even if statehood is declared by an entity and the conditions of the Montevedeo Convention are clearly met, the international community may still hold back consent to statehood based on political or other reasons due to which for effective purposes, there is no statehood in international law. This has obvious problems with reference to the principle of self-determination because it would then mean that the formulation of statehood by declaration as indicative of manifest self-determination would have lesser value that the fact of whether it was recognised by the international community. However, ICJ itself has shown an inclination towards the declaratory theory instead of constitutive theory. For instance, in a case involving the self-proclaimed republic Srpska, the ICJ held that as Srpska met the definition of a state with its controlled defined territory, controlled populations within power, and agreements with other governments, it was a state.

The question that can be raised is why if an entity meets the criteria of statehood should other states withhold recognition to its statehood and if they do withhold it, to what extent should this impact the statehood of the entity. State practice indicates that there are a number of factors why they may withhold recognition even if an entity meets the criteria of statehood; in some instances, recognition may be withheld because of the perceptions of illegitimacy or breach of international law attached with the creation of the new state. Two examples of withholding of recognition can be seen in the cases of Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus, both of which failed to get recognition. In the case of Rhodesia, the fact that new government of White minority wanted to create an Apartheid style state led to the denial of recognition by almost all states in the world. In the case of Northern Cyprus, the states withheld their recognition to Northern Cyprus as it was considered that the territory under their control was due to illegal invasion and occupation by Turkey in 1974. Therefore, as seen in these cases, constitutive approach can work to deny recognition and consequently statehood to entities that are considered to be illegally constituted or whether there is a breach of international law.

In recent times constitutive approach has been generally relegated to historical significance by scholars as it is considered that recognition is declaratory in nature; nevertheless, state practice indicates that constitutive approach is still relevant to understanding whether an entity is a state or not. This is especially relevant when recognition is granted or withheld collectively. This may include instances of statehood not being recognised even when the criteria of statehood are met by the concerned entity. On the whole, there is no duty to recognise an entity as a state as was argued by Lauterpacht, even if it meets the criteria of statehood as has been established by state practice. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the law of recognition as far as statehood is concerned is not a very clearly defined area in international law and based on state practice, it may be said that even if an entity fulfils the criteria of statehood, it may not be able to be recognised as such by many states based on justified or unjustified factors.

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24. Ancietos Mwansa, ‘Barotseland and the advocacy for statehood: A case entailing the complexities of statehood and state recognition in public international law’ (2017) 11 (11) African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 317.
25. L Dimitrios, ‘Between statehood and Somalia: reflections of Somaliland statehood (2011) 10 Global Stud. Law Rev. 789.
26. AK Eggers AK, ‘When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland’ (2007) 30 B.C. Int. Comparative Law Rev. 211.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

There are serious political, social, and humanitarian implications of non-recognition, which create a need to address the grey areas in the law and state practice of statehood and recognition. There are two ways in which recognition affects human rights: first, through recognition weak states may be recognised as ‘juridical sovereign’ even though they may not have any of the trappings of empirical statehood, due to which human rights of the people living in the entity are compromised; second, when entities that have the trappings of statehood are denied recognition on the basis of political or other concerns by the international community, the people in that territory may be denied basic human rights like , self-determination and nationality as in the case of Palestine. Unrecognised states may also face the problem of not being able to develop their economy and infrastructure because of their inability to obtain loans from international credit institutions. As unrecognised states may not be eligible for membership of international organisations, the problem of obtaining loans may rise. Moreover, foreign investors may also be discouraged from investing in these states because international laws and regulations do not apply on these territories, and international markets are also closed to them. Non-recognition can also have impacts for the industries in the entity, like the Northern Cyprus tourism industry faced for a long time.

Unrecognised states are unable to claim rights in the international law because they are not able to approach international for a like the International Court of Justice and are not members of international organisations like the United Nations. As membership of international organisations is based on the acceptance of new members by the existing members, the problem of non-recognition has the common consequence of membership being refused because of the existing members are non-recognising states. A good example of this problem is with respect to Taiwan, which has been unable to get the membership of organisations like the United Nations as well as World Health Organisation. Due to the lack of such membership, there are several political and social implications for countries like Taiwan, which exist on ground but are eluded complete membership of international community. For instance, in the case of Taiwan, it is a well established fact that its membership of both the United Nations and World Health Organisation is blocked by China, which is a permanent member of the Security Council; moreover, as a testament to the political nature of recognition, it can be seen that Taiwan has failed to secure even the General Assembly’s acceptance to its membership because countries that support Chinese position, like African nations, have consistently refused to recognise Taiwan’s statehood.

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29. Jure Vidmar, ‘Statehood And Collective Recognition’ in Routledge Handbook of State Recognition (Routledge 2019).
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty’ (2001) 27 (4) Review of International Studies 519.
33. Ibid.
34. Jonathan Warner, ‘North Cyprus: Tourism and the challenge of non-recognition’ (1999) 7 (2) Journal of Sustainable Tourism 128.
35. Stefan Talmon, ‘The constitutive versus the declaratory theory of recognition: Tertium non datur?’ (2005) 75 (1) The British Year Book of International Law 101.
36. Timothy S Rich, ‘Status for sale: Taiwan and the competition for diplomatic recognition’ (2009) 45 (4) Issues & Studies 159.

It cannot be said that non-recognised states do not exist because state and UN practice both indicate that states can exist despite non-recognition. The case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which existed as a state, and also appeared before the ICJ despite non recognition by other states exemplifies the significance of the declaratory theory. However, the case of Kosovo challenges the declaratory theory. Kosovo declared itself to be a state even though it was created out of a state that already existed. It was supported by some states and not supported by others that refused to recognise it. Nevertheless, 117 states have recognised Kosovo as a state however, the ICJ has not referred to Kosovo’s status as a state in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. In the United Nations, states like the United States and the United Kingdom recognise Kosovo’s statehood but China and Russia deny it. In such a situation, it becomes difficult to state with certainty that Kosovo is a state despite a high number of recognitions. This case is illustrative of the grey areas in the law of statehood in international law.

On the other hand, the withholding of recognition in the case of Southern Rhodesia, which fulfilled the criteria of statehood under the Montevideo Convention, Article 1, but which was thought to be illegitimate in a universal sense, exposes the grey area in even the objective determination of statehood. Therefore, even the declaratory theory stands exposed as not providing clear answers to when an entity achieves statehood. Due to these gaps in the law related to constitution of statehood, the problem is that one cannot say with certainty when entities achieve statehood. Neither the constitutive theory nor the declaratory theory provides a clear and consistent approach to constitution of statehood in international law. This creates a problem for those entities that are as yet to achieve recognition of statehood even if they have manifested their self-determination through self-declaration of statehood. In other words, there is no gainsaying that meeting the objective criteria of statehood as per Montevideo Convention is enough to provide status to the entity or that achieving a high number of recognitions is constitutive of that status. The former notion is challenged by the Southern Rhodesian case and the latter is challenged by the Kosovan case.

Lack of statehood is a serious problem for an entity that claims it, and whose people too self-determine the existence of such status. The literature on this point in the previous chapter indicates that for some such entities, like Taiwan, the lack of recognition posits a situation where it is unable to become a complete member of the international community of states. In such situations, the problems for the entity can be in the nature of social, political and human rights problems. When considered in the light of the at time political nature of recognition, it seems arbitrary that an entity should be denied the status of statehood because some states have the power to withhold or make others withhold such recognition. The lack of recognition should not have a constitutive effect on the status of the entity. At most, the effect can be political in the nature where there are no relations between the non recognising state and the entity. The effect cannot go so far as to deny status. In this respect, international law is ambiguous and the state practice indicates that recognition does have a constitutive effect. Therefore, clearly there is a need to align practice with either the indices of statehood as provided in Montevideo Convention or create a new and more comprehensive definition of statehood. This should include the aspects of recognition, including formal understanding on when recognition can be withheld properly by states.

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37. Cassandra R Veney and Richard J. Payne, ‘Taiwan and Africa: Taipei's continuing search for international recognition’ (2001) 36 (4) Journal of Asian and African Studies 437.
38. Vidmar, ‘Statehood And Collective Recognition’, supra n 32.
39. Kosovo Advisory opinion, ICGJ 423 (ICJ 2010), judgment of 22nd July 2010.

Chapter Four: Conclusion

Academic consensus has not been achieved on when a territorial entity achieves statehood, and on the role of recognition in the formation of the status of statehood. Entities yet to achieve statehood in international law include Palestine, Tibet, Biafra and Catalonia, where self-determination as well as even the achievement of indices of statehood have not led to the constitution of statehood and its recognition by international community of states. The law is therefore ambiguous and the effects of the gaps in the law are related to political, human, and economic rights. It can be said that at this point there is a need to revisit the law related to statehood, clarify the role of recognition in the constitution of statehood, or even lay down the objective criteria based on which states extend recognition. This will help to remove the ambiguities and ensure that arbitrary and political actions of states in non recognition do not impact the status of the factually constituted state.

Bibliography

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Veney CR and Richard J. Payne, ‘Taiwan and Africa: Taipei's continuing search for international recognition’ (2001) 36 (4) Journal of Asian and African Studies 437.

Vidmar J, ‘Kosovo: Unilateral Secession and Multilateral State-Making’ in J. Summers (ed.), Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights (M Nijhoff 2011).

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