Luck Neutralisation and Social Justice

Introduction

It has been noted in a recent work that the ideal of luck-neutralisation is related to the neutralisation of the influence of luck on people’s lives, with specific emphasis on the eradication of the levels of advantage individuals enjoy because “luck is a pervasive force in human existence” and touches almost all aspects of human lives in morally problematic ways. Because luck is arbitrary, it seems morally problematic to explain why the lives of some should be better than the others (or more importantly, why should some be more worse off than the others) simply because of matters of luck. It is common to speak or write about bad luck that may afflict some people in a way that mars their chances in their lives. Bad luck may be a reference to the circumstances that people are born into, with some being more poor than others, or genetically afflicted with disease or disability. Due to arbitrary factors of luck, some people may experience inequalities that are induced by differential luck. When we say that social justice demands that bad luck should be ‘neutralised’, reference is to the elimination of influence of luck on an individual’s life, similar to the need for philosophy dissertation help to address complex ethical dilemmas.

One way of doing this may be through creation of a distributive justice structure as proposed by GA Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, and John Rawls, to whose work reference will be made in this essay. Luck egalitarians propose that it is possible to create a distributive pattern which can eliminate the influence of bad luck on individuals. It has been suggested that one of the tasks of justice is luck neutralisation; in this context, neutralisation of luck is distinguished from mitigation or equalisation of luck. In this regard, Rawls has argued that in the intuitive sense, “the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by social circumstances and good fortune, which are all arbitrary factors. In other words, there is no moral justification in the arbitrary nature of how luck or accident may impact the lives of individuals. Had the distribution been just, then individuals would not be made victims of bad circumstances simply on the matter of luck. Rawls indirectly supports the luck neutralisation theory because he argues that the impact of social and natural contingencies is unjust and leads to differentiation in shares. Rawls ‘difference principle’ provides a framework for providing distributive justice. This essay argues that it is the concern of social justice to neutralise the effect of bad luck. The essay is premised on the treatment of luck neutralisation as an ideal which has to be achieved by the social justice system. The ideal of luck neutralisation proceeds from the idea that luck does exercise significant influence on the lives of individuals. In other words, luck plays a role in determining the levels of advantage that individuals may enjoy in the society. That only luck should determine the levels of advantages open to members of the society is the idea that should be eradicated under the premise of luck neutralisation. The basis for such eradication of luck as a pervasive force in individual life is that it is morally problematic because if only luck were to determine what advantages individuals would have, then there would be little that could be done to change the situation of those whom luck has not favoured.

Luck and justice

Before the relationship between luck and justice can be explored, it would be useful to define luck and describe the ways in which luck can be seen to arise in an individual’s life. Luck can arise as ‘resultant luck’, which relates to the outcomes of actions as affected by luck; ‘circumstantial luck’, which relates to the circumstances in which one acts introduce luck; ‘constitutive luck, which relates to the luck that affects the kind of person an individual is (for instance, genetically predisposed to disease); and ‘antecedent causal luck’, which relates to the way one’s actions are determined by antecedent circumstances. An example of antecedent causal luck can be found in those who grew up more motivated because they were raised in a stimulating environment. Luck is an important factor in the conceptualisation of justice because one of the aims of social justice is to neutralise the effects of bad luck in the lives of people. John Rawls has included the concept of luck in the way he has theorised the concept of justice. Some theorists have specifically mentioned the way in which luck can act as a mediator in how people access justice. Prominent amongst these are Ronald Dworkin and GA Cohen. Dworkin wrote that genetic luck can play a major role in how differences in wealth are generated amongst different individuals in the society depending on what families individuals were born into. These differences are described by Dworkin as unfair to the individuals who are adversely impacted due to genetic luck of being born into poor families. Cohen also argues that luck plays a central role in how some people have more advantages than the others. Cohen argues that luck neutralisation can be done through a method of ideal of equality of access to advantage because people are not in control of determining access to advantage, when this is primarily determined by the circumstances that the person is in. He particularly notes that “anyone who thinks that initial advantage and inherent capacity are unjust distributors thinks so because he believes that they make a person’s fate depend too much on sheer luck.” The luck factor can also impact the way some people have more choices and options as compared to others; indeed, Cohen argues that the “the fundamental distinction for an egalitarian is between choice and luck” in how the fate of people is shaped. in the shaping of people’s fates.” In other words, while access to advantage includes all factors that are outside the control of the individuals, these factors do have an influence on the wealth and status of individuals. Luck neutralisation is related to providing access to advantage so that the matters which are outside the control of the individual can be neutralised, but the outcomes still remain in the control of the individual because the effort is in the control of the individual.

Indeed, the question of luck and its relationship to justice arises from the fact that much of matters of luck are outside the control of the individual and the ways in which luck seems to favour some more than others are arbitrary to say the least. Individuals are impacted by such arbitrary circumstances in the way that they have access to resources, opportunities, and capabilities, with some getting more access than the others simply because of arbitrary matters of luck. The possibility that matters of luck have led to circumstances in some people’s lives (for instance, birth or place of birth) that are more unfair and unjust than the others, makes some question the unjustness of the arbitrary nature of luck and the morally unjustifiable or unjust luck-affected differential standings. Based upon this critical position of moral unjustness of matters related to luck and their impact on differential standings between individuals, it is argued that it is the task of justice to respond to these unjust repercussions. Another important concept that must be considered when discussing luck is that of advantage. Luck gives advantage to some and bad luck gives disadvantage to some, therefore, it is important to understand the notion of advantage. Cohen has explained advantage as the source of goods, including resources and welfare, where these goods in themselves advantageous. Advantage has been described by Cohen as a multidimensional metric that depicts just how well off a person is; in that sense, advantage may also denote a social position. Equalising access to advantage and social position may not be possible or even justified because certain positions of advantage like doctors, generals, or heads of industry also come with certain eligibility criteria. Therefore, to say that these positions are to be equally distributed amongst all members of the society would be fallacious and unadvisable. From that perspective, equality alone cannot be used to determine egalitarian distribution within the society. However, the ideal of luck neutralisaiton can be used to create conditions in which even those who are not attached to positions of advantage have access to advantages like well being.

Distributive justice

Distributive justice theory has been at the forefront of the luck-neutralisation discourse, with theorists like Cohen, Roemer, and, Dworkin arguing on the behalf of the position that justice can be achieved if the society is able to neutralise the impact of luck on the distribution of burdens and benefits for the individuals in the society. On the other hand, Hurley has argued that no purpose of achieving justice can be achieved through luck-neutralisation. In this section, the essay discusses distributive justice and its link to luck. If luck is an important factor in how people’s lives are shaped, then one of the tasks of the social justice ought to be the neutralisation of the effects of bad luck. Rawls has explained that justice is fairness and fairness includes fair equality of opportunity. If justice is fairness then social justice should be structured in a way that it offers fair opportunities to all people. Distributive justice relates to the idea of distribution of social goods amongst the members in the society. If as a matter of principle, all individuals should have access to similar options and choices, then distributive justice may also have to respond to the element of luck that may come in the way of some people facing certain disadvantages over others simply because they are born in a certain family, or subject to certain disabilities. From the perspective of the distributive justice, the state would have to ensure that the individuals in the society are able to access the equal range of opportunity. Rawls has argued that equality to opportunity must relate to primary goods, which include wealth and income.

Luck egalitarian perspective, such as the one offered by Cohen argues that the purpose of social justice can be to eliminate the differential effects on people that are a matter of luck for those people. These differential effects may be related to a number of factors that are personal to the individual’s life; for instance, women may be impacted by gender inequality, or disabled people may be impacted by their lack of access to similar opportunities in some circumstances. Cohen argues that neutralisation of bad luck may mean in the first case that laws are made that allow affirmative action in favour of women who face discrimination, and that while affirmative action may not remove discrimination it its entirety; it may have the impact of eliminating the differential effects of gender on men and women. Similarly for those who are disabled, the concept of reasonable accommodation seeks to neutralise some effects of disability by providing duties that are binding on all individuals to accommodate persons with disabilities as they are placed at a “disadvantage by application to them of conventional requirements or systems.” Again, the effect would not be to completely eliminate all effects of bad luck caused by disability; however, some effects can be neutralised by providing equal opportunities to those who are disabled. One of the theorists to have challenged the ideas of luck-neutralisation is Susan Hurley, who has argued that luck-neutralisation does not lead to an egalitarian pattern of distribution and that other ideals, such as, equality, should be used to justify such a pattern. However, in a recent article, this argument has been challenged. It has been argued that an egalitarian theory of justice can be achieved through luck-neutralisation and an idea of universal access to every available advantage. In such a scheme, the egalitarian aims are achieved without relying on equality.

It needs to be clarified that luck neutralisation is not related to creating equality for people with regard to social positions, rather it is related to levels of advantage. There is a difference between levels of advantage and social positions. Luck neutralisation ought to be aimed at equalising levels of advantage, and not social positions or specific jobs, which can only be accessed on the basis of merit, aptitude and other factors. This is explained as follows:

“It is not unjust that some people can be pilots while others cannot, but it is unjust that people who have the ability to be pilots can achieve levels of wellbeing that others cannot. As long as people who cannot become pilots can, through some other path open to them, end up as well off as people who can become pilots, justice is attained without undesirable social consequences.”

Therefore, the framework of distributive justice does not argue that all individuals should attain certain social positions, rather it argues that social positions should not restrict the individuals from attaining equal levels of advantage regardless of social positions. The next section of this essay considers some of the arguments made in favour of using justice for the purpose of luck neutralisation.

Defence of ideal of luck neutralisation

The ideal of luck neutralisation allows the distribution of advantages, burdens, and benefits amongst the members of the society in an egalitarian manner. It cannot be argued that the pervasive effect of luck is not seen in the society or that it is morally correct that individuals should be left to their own luck as far as advantages are concerned. For instance, luck does play a role in how some receive educational opportunities while others don’t or how some people have the means to achieve what they can with the talents they were born with while others can’t. Therefore, from the perspective of luck neutralisation, the argument that the influence of luck is unjust is persuasive. The question is whether luck neutralisation can be used as a method for achieving justice. One of the most influential critiques of luck neutralisation as a way of achieving justice has come from Susan Hurley, who has argued that the ideal of luck neutralisation does not really justify an egalitarian pattern of distribution. A pattern of egalitarian distribution instead has to be justified on the basis of equality. To this argument, a counter argument is provided which is based on the premise that luck neutralisation can provide a foundation for an egalitarian theory of justice. In this context, luck neutralisation can be achieved through a universal access to every available advantage. While this is based on the concept of equality that Susan Hurley herself seems to prefer, the significance of the same is derived from the ideal of luck neutralisation. Through an egalitarian distribution of advantages, it is possible to achieve the neutralisation of luck as a factor.

Egalitarian distribution of advantage or the ideal of equality of access to advantage is what Cohen has presented as luck egalitarianism. Cohen argues that a person cannot be held responsible for the access they have to advantage, because such access can be due to the arbitrary factor of luck which may place one in a more advantageous position than the other. Therefore, luck neutralisation or eradication the effect of luck on the life of an individual would require that the access to advantage is distributed equally amongst the members of the society. Access to advantage means access to the goods or things that one does not have control over because these are a matter of chance and not choice, but they do exert considerable influence on how well off people are. To explain this in the context of chance and choice is important since this is an important distinction made by Cohen to explain the things that we do not have control over (chance) and the things that we do have control over (choice). The access to chance goods must be distributed in an egalitarian manner since these are out of the control of individuals. However, what individuals do with the opportunities that are presented to them depends on them. They may seek advantage out of these opportunities or they may waste these opportunities due to individual factors that can be controlled by them. This justifies the egalitarian access to advantage but no access to egalitarian distribution of advantage. The outcomes that result from the exercise of individual control once access to advantage is given to individuals are just even if some individuals are not able to derive as much from the opportunities as others have. Thus, access to advantage must be equal but there can be no equal distribution of positions of advantage. In simpler terms, everyone must have access to education, since this is an advantage but, everyone cannot be made doctors or industry leaders as that will depend on how individuals who were given access to education used that access as per their individual choices. The argument against luck neutralisation, made particularly forcefully by Susan Hurley is that while luck neutralisation can specify the ideal, it cannot justify a pattern of distribution that is egalitarian. The problem with specifying an egalitarian pattern of distribution is that luck itself is a subjective concept, which may mean one of two things when used in context of good or bad luck. It may mean something interpersonal, where the good or bad luck of one is determined by the comparator of another who may provide an example of better or worse luck, as noted by Hurley: “I have bad luck when what I and others have is a matter of luck, and I have less than others.” Another sense in which luck may be explained could be counterfactual, where we “compare our actual situation with other possible situations [we] might have been in. I have bad luck when what I have is a matter of luck and I am worse off than I might have been.” These different ways of conceptualising luck present a problem for providing an egalitarian patter of distribution. In the interpersonal sense where luck is conceptualised in a comparative sense, neutralising of luck would require equalisation, which would mean that equality and not luck neutralisation is the basis for egalitarian distribution. In the counterfactual sense, where we are comparing our state of luck with our own life situations, the question of equalising would not arise.

The above arguments would hold true to a conceptualisation of luck neutralisation that is based on the egalitarian distribution pattern. However, when we treat luck neutralisation from the perspective of chance and control, where access to chance is equalised but choice is left to people as to how they employ their chances, then justice can be achieved. This would mean that because individuals were provided access to every level of advantage and they cannot hold luck responsible for their distributive share because they also had capacity for control at every distributive level. In order to ensure such as society where luck is neutralised as form of social justice, it may be required that there should be no levels of advantage that are accessible to some and inaccessible to others because that would mean that there are some people who are still impacted by the factor of luck or bad luck in their life. As argued by Dekker, it is only be eradicating the levels of advantage can there be a true application of the ideal of luck neutralisation. When all levels of advantages are eradicated and individuals are simply given equal access to all advantage then luck eradication will be achieved. In such as society, justice will prevail because what the individuals make of the access depends on control. Individuals cannot complain that is due to bad luck that they did not achieve something because those goods that are left to chance, were given to all equally.

Conclusion

Every individual in the society where luck is not neutralised is affected by chance or luck, which is arbitrary in nature. In such as society, the individual may be affected by bad luck as a matter of chance, which may relate to birth, talent, or other such arbitrary factor. In such a society, the individuals who are affected by the arbitrary factor of bad luck may suffer from disadvantage, which may impact them in the long run. Luck neutralisation is therefore a response to the problem of luck as a factor in providing advantage to some over the others. Luck neutralisation is an ideal which can be achieved if universal access to This is a part of the egalitarian theory of justice, which is different from the idea of equality of advantages because the latter may not always be possible or even practical in itself. However, when equality is applied as part of the ideal of luck neutralisation, it can provide a more just society. This is because the element of control is also applicable which can ensure that while individuals get access to advantage they are responsible for that which they can control. Chance is a matter of luck. It is arbitrary because people have no control over it. To allow chance to control the lives of people would be morally wrong. Therefore, it is more just to provide access to advantage based on chance but let individuals be responsible for what is in their control. This could lead to the creation of a more just society.

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