The Dublin Agreement

Abstract

The Dublin system was created to foster a collective system for refugee allocation and protection as between the member states. Instead of fostering a system of solidarity, the Dublin system engenders the system of responsibility shifting and preventing refugees from entering into the states which have disproportionate burden of refugee allocation. This is because these states are external border states and are on the migration route especially from countries like Turkey. The 2015 immigration crisis has exposed these weaknesses of the Dublin system.

Introduction

The Dublin system was introduced in 1990. The ECRE (European Council of Refugees and Exiles) has critiqued the system on the ground that the Dublin regulation comes in the way of access to legal rights and personal welfare for the asylum seekers; in particular there is criticism with respect to the right to a fair examination of asylum claim being impeded by the system. It has also been noted that the system has not led to effective protection, and that there is an uneven distribution of asylum claims.

This essay critically discusses whether there is some merit to these criticisms of the Dublin system. The specific area that this essay focusses on within the Dublin system is the allocation system and its overreliance on the principle of state of first entry being the state that is responsible for providing access to asylum protection for the majority of cases.

The Dublin system

The Dublin Convention of 15 June 1990 came into force in September 1997. In 1990, when the convention was first signed, there were twelve members of the convention: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. Other states like Switzerland joined the system at a later point. In 2003, the Dublin II Regulation was adopted and it replaced the Dublin Convention; the EC 343/2003 is the Dublin II Regulation. Subsequently, the regulation was replaced in July 2012 by the Dublin system III after the European Commission proposed amendments to the Dublin Regulation in December 2008 for reforming of the Dublin System.

The common principle underlying all these regulations is that the Member State where finger prints are first stored or where an asylum claim is made becomes responsible for the asylum claim. In 2016, a legislative proposal was made by the European Commission to reform the Dublin system. The reform proposal aimed to streamline and supplement the current rules with a corrective allocation mechanism. The allocation mechanism under the Dublin system is the principal focus of this essay because the system is at the heart of the challenges and problems that are coming in the way of achieving a fair and efficient system of refugee protection as will be discussed throughout this essay. Dublin III provides these criteria in Articles 7-15.

It may be reiterated that the underlying principle is to streamline the process so as to give access to swift access to asylum process, and to prevent multiple applications for asylum. Proceeding on this idea, the fundamental principles of the Dublin system are as follows. First, the asylum seeker will file an application for international protection in the state where the asylum seeker is or where the fingerprints are registered under the EURODAC. Second, a set of criteria will be used under the determination procedure. This could lead to the asylum seeker access to the asylum process in the state of first entry or transfer decision if another state is found responsible. Finally, the asylum seeker’s application is examined. Thus, the Dublin system is based on allowing the asylum seeker access to a process that sees them registering their fingerprints and making asylum request to the state of first entry or another state if the other state is found responsible with the underlying principle that the asylum seeker is allowed to have access to a swift and streamlined asylum application process.

1. ECRE, ECRE Comments on the European Commission Proposal to recast the Dublin Regulation (ECRE 2015).
2. UNHCR, UNHCR's Comments on the European Commission's Proposal for a recast of the Dublin and Eurodac Regulations (UNHCR 2009).
3. "Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities (Deposited with the Government of Ireland)". Council of the European Union.
4. Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national". Official Journal of the European Union. L (50/1). 25 February 2003.
5. Dublin III Regulation (No. 604/2013) "European Commission Proposal to recast the Dublin Regulation". Publications Office of the European Union.
6. Ibid
7. European Parliament, Dublin Regulation on international protection applications (European Parliamentary Research Service 2020).
8. Ibid.

Although the Dublin system is based on the idea that the asylum seeker should have access to an asylum process that is speedy, this goal has eluded the EU because the principles on which the asylum system is based does not allow the fair and efficient management of refugee and asylum applications. The Dublin system establishes criteria for determining which member state is responsible for an asylum request, and to some extent makes such states responsible for the asylum seeker; however, it has to be noted that there is also discretion provided to the states so that they can derogate from these criteria, through the use of discretionary clauses. There are 'dependent persons clause' and the 'humanitarian clause' which can be used by the states to derogate from these criteria. The Chapter IV of Dublin III provides this; for instance, Article 17(2) provides that states may request some other state to take charge of an applicant in order to bring together any family relations on humanitarian grounds and that this can be done at any time before a first decision is made by the state. This has been used by Germany in 2015 in response to the refugee crisis when it suspended the regulation for Syrian nationals, through application of the 'sovereignty clause'. Thus, the system of asylum applications is not as straightforward and does not put a clear responsibility on the states because states can use these different clauses to water down their responsibility under the system.

Dublin Regulation also establishes a hierarchy of criteria for determining responsibility for an asylum application under Chapter III. The first is the Family reunification criterion, so that the state should be the one in which other family members are already located. In cases where Family reunification is not relevant, then the question arises if the applicant obtained a residence document or visa through another state, which then becomes responsible. In the event that these first two criteria do not apply, then the state where the applicant entered the EU irregularly becomes responsible. There are two points of clarification that are provided for which state is responsible; first, with respect to the asylum seeker coming into a country where visa is waived; and second where application for international protection is made in the international transit area of an airport. In both cases, the state where the asylum seeker has arrived or in whose airport the application is made, becomes responsible.

Dublin III, article 8, provides that if one family member’s application is not yet been the subject of a first decision regarding substance, that state will hear the application. Dublin III also requires that the applications of the family members are processed together by one state so that the decisions with respect to family members remain consistent. Thus, there are some provisions within the Dublin system which seek to provide some respite to families.

The Europe immigration crisis and questions of reform of the Dublin system

In the recent years, the immigration crisis in Europe has led to questions being raised about the Dublin system’s efficacy to address refugee allocations. The immigration crisis in Europe is refugee crisis triggered by the wars in countries in the Middle East and North Africa, leading to populations from these countries coming to Europe as refugees. 2015 saw an acceleration in the crisis with refugees coming in thousands from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan due to wars in these countries which led to mass displacement of populations in these regions. The resultant influx of refugees into Europe and the ways in which the European countries have handled this crisis also raises questions about the efficacy of the Dublin system. It is notable that prior to the refugee crisis, the Dublin system was being seen as a successful system that had managed to reform and improve refugee allocation system by developing an EU wide reform of refugee protection systems. It was being said that the Common European Asylum System or the CEAS had managed to create a more refugee friendly system, especially in its second phase which ended in 2013. On the other hand, there were some critics of this system even prior to the refugee crisis, with one system calling the system ‘lipstick on a pig’. There were even criticisms that the system did not provide refugee international protection effectively nor achieve the solidarity objective. The refugee crisis in 2015 brought these criticisms of the Dublin into sharp focus.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. The Dublin Regulation, 604/2013.
4. Ibid, Preamble, para 7.

To put the crisis into perspective with the help of statistical information, in 2016, 1204300 first time asylum-seekers applied for international protection in the EU while this number was 526 700 in 2014. Germany received the highest number of applications at 722300, followed by Italy (112200), France (76000), Greece (49900) and Austria (39900). The majority of asylum-seekers came from Syria (334 800), followed by Afghanistan (183000) and Iraq (127000). At the same time, 5082 migrants lost their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. These figures provide a background of the sudden increase in the immigration from war torn countries into the EU and also a background of the kind of refugee allocation crisis that the EU was facing at this time so as to understand how the Dublin system responded to this crisis. The structural weakness that the Dublin system has, is exposed by the immigration crisis in the EU. As the system is dependent on the principle that the state where the asylum seeker first enters or applies for asylum becomes responsible for the processing of the application, the major structural weakness exposed by this system in the EU migration crisis is the problem with the refugee allocation because the burden falls on the states where the refugees have entered irregularly. This is one of the reasons why there have been calls for revising the Dublin system. The most prominent of these calls is reflected in the Resolution adopted by the EU parliament in 2016. Through this resolution, the EU Parliament has noted that there is a need to revise the criterion that it is the Member State of first entry that is responsible for the examination of a claim for international protection. As this system is not as yet adopted in the Dublin system, the current system’s allocation of refugees can be assessed for fairness and efficiency. It can be considered whether the failure to have a centralised system for considering allocations has implications for the Dublin system.

1. Mohammad Zamani and Amin Zarghami, ‘The refugee and immigration crisis in Europe: urgent action to protect the mental health of children and adolescents’ (2016) 58 (5) Journal of Adolescent Health 582.
2. Ibid.
3. UNHCR, Moving Further Toward a Common European Asylum System: UNHCR’s statement on the EU asylum legislative package (UNHCR 2013).
4. Ibid.
5. Steve Peers, ‘The second phase of the Common European Asylum System: A brave new world–or lipstick on a pig’ (Statewatch Analysis 2013).
6. European Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin (European Parliament 2015).
7. Anja Radjenovic, Reform of the Dublin system (European Parliamentary Research Service, Member’s research service 2019).
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. Ibid
11. European Parliament resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)).
12. Ibid

It has been noted that the main task of the Dublin system is not to ensure the sharing of responsibility because it was not designed for this; but to “assign responsibility for processing an asylum application to a single Member State.” Thus, the frequently applied criterion for assessing which state is responsible for processing asylum application is irregular entry, so that the Member State through which the asylum-seeker first entered becomes responsible for examining their asylum claim. The EU Parliament in its resolution of 2016 has suggested that the Dublin system can be overhauled so that the collection of asylum applications is done at Union level so that asylum-seeker applications can be viewed as a whole and so that a central system is established for the allocation of responsibility for international protection. The EU parliament also suggested that the Dublin system can be reformed to ensure that thresholds per Member State relative to the number of arrivals can be established so that secondary movements can be prevented. This can happen because through a centralised system of processing asylum applications, all Member States become fully involved and do not have individual responsibility for allocation of applicants to other Member States. An important point made for the reform of the Dublin system is that any new system adopted should incorporate the key concepts of family unity and the best interests of the child.

Refugee allocations under the Dublin system

A recent survey conducted with 18,000 citizens in 15 European countries to explore what kind of common asylum regime would they support for allocation of asylum seekers across countries and the findings show that the large majority of the respondents supported a proportional system of allocation so that allocation is proportional to every country’s capacity to take refugees instead of the current policy of allocation based on the country of first entry. The support for the proportional allocation system also persisted amongst the majority of the respondents even when made aware that a proportional allocation may also increase the number of asylum seekers allocated to their own country, which results suggest that there is a concern about the fairness of the responsibility-sharing mechanism. It is argued that the Dublin system does not include a fair responsibility-sharing mechanism, which is one of the reasons why the refugee crisis in the EU beginning 2015 was ill-managed. Some member states have also addressed the need to have a proportional allocation mechanism whereby asylum seekers can be allocated on the basis of the country’s capacity and not on the basis of whether the state is the first country of entry for the refugee. These calls for the reform of the Dublin system are based on the problems that are seen in the current system of allocations of asylum applications.

The refugee allocations under the Dublin system is explained to some extent in the previous section, where the essay discussed how the allocation of asylum-applications across member states is done under the Dublin system. To briefly encapsulate that discussion before proceeding to critically evaluate the system of allocation, the Dublin system is premised on the principle that the member state where the refugee entered first, or where their finger prints were taken, or where the application was made first, becomes responsible for the processing of the application of the asylum seeker. Predominantly, the state where the refugee first enters, becomes responsible. There are several reasons why this system is criticised for its inability to foster a fair, efficient and in solidarity mechanisms in refugee allocations, which will be discussed in this part of the essay.

1. Radjenovic, supra n 19, 2.
2. Ibid
3. European Parliament resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)), para 38.
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Kirk Bansak, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner, ‘Europeans support a proportional allocation of asylum seekers’ (2017) 1(7) Nature Human Behaviour 1.
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration (European Commission 2015).

At the outset, it may be mentioned that the EU refugee crisis is the one recent event that has exposed the flaws in the allocation system under the Dublin system. The crisis saw the rapid increase in asylum applications, with chaos in how the applications were processed, and also events where refugees had to wait for considerable periods of time to receive some respite. Moreover, the crisis also led to the suspension of the Schengen agreement for some time and the reissuance of border controls by a number of countries.

The allocation rule in the Dublin system, which emphasises on the responsibility of the state of first entry, has been criticised because the burden on the external border countries of the EU is disproportionate due to the geographical location of these countries and regardless of their ability to take a certain number of refugees. A report has suggested that due to the perception of burden being disproportionately placed on external border countries, there are impediments in promoting harmonisation of EU asylum systems and integration, and instead there is dissension among states within the Dublin system. Due to these reasons, it is argued that this system does not promote solidarity among the states and eventually impedes the integration of people who need international protection through the system. Coming back to the disproportionate burden for the external border states, the refugee crisis has shown how these border states (especially those that are along the migrant route and border non-EU countries, such as Greece and Hungary), became the recipients of majority of the refugees coming in from the Middle East through the migrant route and the border non-EU countries.

Greece is a good example of the point being made above about disproportionate burden for the external border states. Greece has been one of the countries in the EU where there has been an influx of refugees and since 2007, reports documenting deficiencies at different stages of the refugee experience, have been demonstrating the problems with refugee allocation system. Since 2010, there have been significant migration flows to Evros, where Greece and Turkey share a land border. The majority of the irregular entries of refugees into EU are following the route through Turkey into Greece. As per the CEAS and the Dublin system which is part of the CEAS, Greece has had to evaluate all asylum requests it receives except those that can be defined as the another member state’s responsibility. As per the predominant system of assigning responsibility for each asylum claim, which is for the first State entered, Greece has been held to be responsible for a large proportion of the applications for international protection. Greece on its own part has not had a sound record of managing the refugee claims as per the obligations under the Dublin system; this was also the reason for the European Court of Human Rights deciding against Greece and holding that Greece’s response is also a reflection on the gaps of the Dublin system in addressing the issue of international protection of refugees, holding:

1. Kayvan Bozorgmehr and Katharina Wahedi, ‘Reframing solidarity in Europe: Frontex, frontiers, and the fallacy of refugee quota’ (2017) 2(1) The Lancet Public Health e10.
2. Bansak et al, supra n 30.
3. P McDonough, M Kmak and J van Selm, Sharing responsibility for refugee protection in Europe: Dublin reconsidered (European Council for Refugees and Exiles 2008); European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Dublin II regulation: Lives on hold (European Comparative Report Tech. Rep 2013).
4. McDonough et al, ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Katarina Kosmina, ‘Mapping the Language of ‘Crisis’: How Discourse Mismanagement Impeded Solidarity in the European Union?’ (IED 2016).
7. Paul McDonough and Evangelia Tsourdi, ‘The “other” Greek crisis: Asylum and EU solidarity’ (2012) 31(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 67.
8. Ibid

“[N]umerous reports and materials [...] agree[d] as to the practical difficulties involved in the application of the Dublin system in Greece, the deficiencies of the asylum procedure and the practice of direct or indirect refoulement on an individual or a collective basis.”

In its judgment, the European Court of Human Rights also found that Greece was liable for ill treatment of an asylum-seeker, while also holding Belgium responsible for violating the same standards in returning the asylum-seeker to Greece. In a case before the Court of Justice, the court held that member states cannot transfer asylum-seekers on “substantial grounds” and must either find another responsible state or process the applications. While Greece was found liable for violating the rights of the asylum seeker, there are also challenges that Greece faced under the Dublin system refugee allocation system. For example, in 2010 Greece received 10,000 new asylum applications when it had less than 1,000 total reception places. By the end of 2010, Greece had a backlog of 45000 applications that were not yet processed. Even though Greece may be criticised for not processing applications as per the requirements of the Dublin system, it cannot be denied that there was a significant amount of refugees coming in due to its location, which may be difficult for it to accept. Indeed, this is one of the issues with the Dublin system that it may disproportionately burden some countries due to the principle of the state of first entry being responsible in most cases for asylum application allocation. Due to this, even the European Commission proposed to suspend transfers to a states where asylum systems were under “particular pressure”.

If it is accepted that some states may face a disproportionate burden to process asylum applications, then questions can be raised about the ‘solidarity principle’, which is the obligation of other States to share the responsibilities of those that are under pressure with regard to the asylum system. In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 80 incorporates “the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications” for governing all policies enacted under Articles 77 through 79, which relates to border checks, asylum and immigration. The principle of solidarity runs through several provisions of the EU law. Another example can be seen in the Article 74 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which requires the Council to enact “measures to ensure administrative cooperation between member states and with the Commission in all areas under Title V. Within this title, a provision that is relevant to the current topic of discussion is Article 67(2) which requires “solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals” for framing “a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control”. Therefore, there is a requirement of solidarity that is enshrined in the EU treaties and which is relevant to the cooperation between states with respect to the asylum process. The question is whether this principle of solidarity is driving the refugee allocation system or is missing in this system. The other member states have cooperated with Greece by entering into arrangements with Greece through funding programmes. However, these have not extended to taking on the responsibility for the refugees’ processing of asylum applications. The EU has tried to address this problem by relocating refugees in the case of Italy and Greece in 2015. This was done by the EU Council which agreed to redistribute 120,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other member states. However, despite the EU Council’s agreement on this issue, the relocation process was slow and many refugees had not been relocated to the other countries even by the end of 2015.

1. Ibid.
2. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (Judgment) (2011) Appl. No. 30696/09, para. 347.
3. Ibid.
4. Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. et al. v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Judgment) (Grand Chamber) (2011).
5. McDonough and Tsourdi, supra n 40, 70.
6. Ibid.
7. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM(2008) 0243 final, 2008.

Another criticism of the Dublin system is that it encourages member states to opt-out of their responsibilities because of the constraints of the system; because governments have the advantage of opt-out clauses within EU immigration and asylum law, member states have used these clauses and other policy tools to restrict the number of asylum applications they do receive. This compounds the problem of unequal allocation that is seen in the Dublin system. Some statistics can be used here to illustrate the extent to which different member states provide refugee international protection where they are all bound by the broader principles of protection of refugees and asylum seekers in the Dublin system; the Eurostat reported that in the last quarter of 2015 the recognition rates varied significantly with states like Croatia granting protection status to only 14% of applicants, and Hungary granting to 17% while states like Germany gave it to 72%, and Malta gave it to 85% of the applicants.

Due to the disparities in how states treat asylum applications, with some states not processing asylum applications or not granting protection status to the majority of the applicants, there is also a problem of refugees fleeing the EU states that have poor record in this context and trying to go to countries where they believe that they would receive better treatment from the asylum system. In response, states try to trigger a Dublin return so that the states where the refugees entered first would be legally obliged to take back the refugees. However, this also delays the refugees’ access to international protection and also triggers a face-off between states. Thus, instead of engendering a spirit of cooperation and solidarity between states, the Dublin system engenders the opposite. In the meantime, the refugees are not able to get the respite that they need and deserve for international protection. The European Court of Human Rights has tried to respond to this problem by prohibiting states from relying on the Dublin Regulation to send asylum seekers back to the first state for a decision on the asylum application and to rather require that the states provide the applicants an opportunity to contest their return by presenting evidence that the first EU state they entered has a deficient asylum system. This decision has been criticised for not remedying system-wide deficits but merely providing incentives for states to respond to the Dublin Regulation proceedings by offering individualised relief, and for not being a true system of responsibility-sharing, which is characterised by states upholding their duty to handle refugee flows in an equitable manner but an “ad hoc, remedial attempt at honoring human rights where Dublin’s assumption of “similarity between protection standards, procedures, and most importantly outcomes that simply does not exist.”

1. McDonough and Tsourdi, supra n 40.
2. Council Decision 1523/2015, 2015 O.J. (L 239) 146 (relocating 24,000 asylum seekers from Italy); Council Decision 1601/2015, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80 (relocating 15,500 asylum seekers from Italy).
3. Ibid.
4. Maryellen Fullerton, ‘Asylum crisis Italian style: the Dublin regulation collides with European human rights law’ (2016) 29 Harv. Hum. Rts. 57.
5. E Neumayer, ‘Asylum Destination Choice what makes some West European countries more Attractive than Others?’ (2004) 5 European Union Politics 155.
6. Ibid.
7. Kosmina, supra n 39, 5, fn11.
8. Fullerton, supra n 52.
9. Ibid
10. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255.

Finally, the problems with the allocation system under the Dublin system have only led to the states attempting to create impediments for refugees to enter their territory by building walls and fences. This has been linked to the failure of the Dublin system to have a fair and equitable system of allocating refugees amongst the European states. It is also argued that the effect of the lack of such fair system of allocation is that there is responsibility shifting between the member states. A important argument in this regard goes back to the “rendering of Europe’s border states disproportionately responsible for asylum seekers.” This leads to the criticism that the responsibility-allocation criteria places external border countries at a disadvantage and fosters lack of solidarity as states try to shift responsibility.

Conclusion

To conclude this essay, the Dublin system does not attain the goal of solidarity and fairness in how refugee allocation is carried out. At the heart of the system is the allocation process which leads to burden being disproportionately being put on external border states of EU like Greece. This only leads to states indulging in responsibility shifting, building walls and fences to discourage refugees from entering their borders, and using opt out provisions or other policy methods to avoid their responsibility. Eventually, the refugees and asylum seekers are the ones who are disadvantaged by these problems because their applications are not processed, or takes a long time to be processed. Refugees may not even be able to enter into the states because they are deploying border control mechanisms like walls and fences to keep them out. This is because the system is overwhelmingly dependent on the principle that the state into which the refugees first entered will be responsible for the processing of the applications of the refugees or for providing international protection. Because the system is not truly based on the system of solidarity where EU member states share the burden of asylum allocation in an equitable manner, these problems have arisen and have exposed the weaknesses in the Dublin system, especially in the light of the immigration crisis beginning 2015.

1. Fullerton, supra n 52.
2. Ashley Binetti Armstrong, ‘You Shall Not Pass: How the Dublin System Fueled Fortress Europe’ (2019) 20 Chi. J. Int'l L. 332, 356.
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid, 349.

Bibliography

Books

McDonough P, M Kmak and J van Selm, Sharing responsibility for refugee protection in Europe: Dublin reconsidered (European Council for Refugees and Exiles 2008)

Journals

Armstrong AB, ‘You Shall Not Pass: How the Dublin System Fueled Fortress Europe’ (2019) 20 Chi. J. Int'l L. 332.

Bansak K, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner, ‘Europeans support a proportional allocation of asylum seekers’ (2017) 1(7) Nature Human Behaviour 1.

Bozorgmehr K and Katharina Wahedi, ‘Reframing solidarity in Europe: Frontex, frontiers, and the fallacy of refugee quota’ (2017) 2(1) The Lancet Public Health e10.

Fullerton M, ‘Asylum crisis Italian style: the Dublin regulation collides with European human rights law’ (2016) 29 Harv. Hum. Rts. 57.

McDonough P and Evangelia Tsourdi, ‘The “other” Greek crisis: Asylum and EU solidarity’ (2012) 31(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 67.

Neumayer E, ‘Asylum Destination Choice what makes some West European countries more Attractive than Others?’ (2004) 5 European Union Politics 155.

Zamani M and Amin Zarghami, ‘The refugee and immigration crisis in Europe: urgent action to protect the mental health of children and adolescents’ (2016) 58 (5) Journal of Adolescent Health 582.

Reports

ECRE, ECRE Comments on the European Commission Proposal to recast the Dublin Regulation (ECRE 2015).

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration (European Commission 2015).

European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM(2008) 0243 final, 2008.

European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Dublin II regulation: Lives on hold (European Comparative Report Tech. Rep 2013).

European Parliament, Dublin Regulation on international protection applications (European Parliamentary Research Service 2020).

European Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin (European Parliament 2015).

Kosmina K, ‘Mapping the Language of ‘Crisis’: How Discourse Mismanagement Impeded Solidarity in the European Union?’ (IED 2016).

Peers S, ‘The second phase of the Common European Asylum System: A brave new world–or lipstick on a pig’ (Statewatch Analysis 2013).

Radjenovic A, Reform of the Dublin system (European Parliamentary Research Service, Member’s research service 2019).

UNHCR, UNHCR's Comments on the European Commission's Proposal for a recast of the Dublin and Eurodac Regulations (UNHCR 2009).

UNHCR, Moving Further Toward a Common European Asylum System: UNHCR’s statement on the EU asylum legislative package (UNHCR 2013).

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